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Marcus Tullius Cicero was a pivotal character in the tra n sitional period
from the end of the Roman Republic to the beg i n n i ng of what was to become the
Roman Empire . His contribution to o u r modern knowledge of Roman history,
mores, jud icial p ractices, the daily lives of the patricia n class and more is
invaluable. More than any othe r Roman, he left us with a breathing account of
life in his times, through his correspondence with friends, fami ly and associates,
his many political and p h ilosophica l doctrines and, of cou rse, h is speeches in the
Senate and trial cou rts of Rome. Cicero was brilliant, clever and fu nny and , yet,
prone to u n controllable ego and shockingly bad political choices and decisions.
These political errors are crucial to Cicero's u ltimate decision to return to active
political life and leadership in 44 B . C . after the assassination of J u lius Caesar,
including the delivery of fou rteen extant Phil ippics against Marcus Antonius, a
decision which led to his own executio n . Th is paper examines the behavior and
actions of a man who only wanted to recapture the earlier glory of h is consular
year, 63 B . C . , but who inevitably seemed to always take the wrong cou rse.
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O n March 1 5 , 44 B . C . , 1 J u lius Caesar was assassinated . A nominal Republic,
shaken for years by challenges to its rules a nd laws, was once again th rown into
turmoil. Rome's future was at stake a nd no one knew how to respond: not the Senate ,
n o r its consul, n o r the conspirators nor t h e Roman people .

I n the immed iate aftermath

of the m u rder, Rome was paralyzed . I n 44, Marcus Antonius was Caesar's co-consul
and , therefore , his obvious successor and remaining lead ing citize n . Since he was not
a participa nt in the plot, he had been detai ned outside the Senate while the deed was
taking place . As soon as he realized what had occu rred , unsure of his own fate, he
immed iately fled rather than seize the reins in the resu ltant fu ror. I nstead of declaring
themselves saviors of the Republic and alleviating fear, the assassins, Caesar's fellow
senators, many of whom had been h is lifelong friends, also fled . Panic and
pandemonium ensued. From that moment on, Rome (or at least those who u pheld the
old constitution) fought for her life , naively trying to defend and preserve an ideal form of
government that had virtually disappeared. Finally, the formation of the Second
Triumvirate in 43 was the veritable death knell fo r restoring the Republic that had once
existed .
Once calm had been restored , amnesty granted , and comprom ise reached , for
approximately two months following Caesa r's death , Antonius seemed to be acting
moderately towards the assassins and showing deference to the Senate. He proposed
that Caesar's acta be approved , that the assassins go u n pu n ished , b ut not praised , that
Dolabella be appointed co-consul in accordance with Caesar's wishes, and that an
atmosphere of compromise prevail. Frisch believes that this policy placed Antonius in a
1

Hereafter, a l l dates are B . C . un less otherwise noted .
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position of almost absol ute power wh ich , in the opinion of many of h is countrymen, he
abused2 . Antonius' subseq uent behavior became the u ltimate provocation for the
fou rteen extant speeches that are known as Marcus Tu llius Cicero's Philippics, a
n ickname based on Demosthenes' speeches against Philip of Macedo n .
This thesis wi ll examine Cicero's motivatio n , in 44-43, for u ndertaking the
leadership role that u ltimately led to his execution . It will investigate h is escalating
hatred and vitriol for Marcus Anton ius, h is strong a llegiance to and promotion of
Octavia n , and h is decision to re-enter active political life , in effect, to take the helm of
the slowly sinking ship that was the Roman Republic in 44-43. The q uestions posed
here are whether Cicero's behavior was cou rageous and selfless, without regard for h is
own life , believing that he could restore the Republic for the people of Rome or whether
he had personal and ulterior motives for inciting a civil war. Another issue is whether
C icero contin ued to act rationally as the situation escalated or whether his abil ity to see
th ings clearly was affected by h is knowledge that he had u ndertaken a lost cause.

CICERO: BRIEF BACKGROUND WITH REFERENCE TO PHILIPPICS

Cicero , who had been consul in 63 B . C . , had not held a real position of influence
at Rome for almost twenty years. Nevertheless, he remained involved and interested in
activities in public life . At first he applauded the policy of compromise, singing its
praises in terms like amnestia and oblivia sempitema. Frisch believes that in the days
directly after the m u rder, Cicero even considered collaborating with Anton ius, although

2 Hartvig Frisch , Cicero's Fight fo r the Republic: The Historical Background o f Cicero's Philippics (Copen hagen:

Glydendal, 1 946) 56.
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he does not ind icate what form that collaboration would take. 3 However, by April ,
Cicero h a d become angrily disappointed with the conspirators' behavior a n d was
lamenting the fact that Rome was under the control of Antonius and Dolabella, the
consuls chosen by Caesar, not the people. 4 He had become aware of Antonius'
questionable and, to C icero, illegal actions in both Rome and the provinces. He
vacillated for months as to whether or not he should retu rn to Rome, knowing that when
he did, he would be taking on Antonius. 5 He u ltimately decided that his place was in
the Senate, and retu rn ing to Rome on August 3 1 , 44, with in weeks assu med a position
of leadership such as he had not held since the days of h is consulship. 6
Posterity is fortu nate that Cicero was a prolific writer and m uch of what he wrote
in that crucial period remains. However, his words, actions and decisions d u ring the
period after Caesar's death a re open to interpretation and debate . Dickinson states that
Cicero was not moved by a desire for power or money. 7 Shackleton-Bailey says that no
one will everknow "after what private hesitations Cicero set foot on the fatal ladder." 8
He bel ieves that C icero , aware of the risk and exh ibiting g reat cou rage, may have had
an u rge for "primacy . . . not like Caesar or Pompey, but as he had sa id , 'eq uality in
freedom, primacy in esteem ."'9 M itchell insists that Cicero was not seeking a leadership
role in a restored Republic because he knew he was too old . He would content himself
with the prestige that came with his consular status since he really had no strategy for

3 Frisch

1 1 9.

5 Frisch

1 22 .

4

Att. 14.6.2, 14.9.2 and 14.1 0.1.

6

Frisch 1 26 .
John Dickinson, Death o f a Republic: Political Thought a t Rome 59-44 B. C. (New York: Macmi l la n , 1 963) 44.

7

8

D.R. S h a ckleton Bailey, Cicero (New York: Scribner, 1 97 1 ) 246-249.

9 S h ackleton

Bailey 246-249.
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saving the Republic nor any actions he could suggest to the conspi rators. 1°

F risch

concu rs , stating that Cicero's willing ness to become the leader of the Republican
opposition in the Senate exhibited his cou rage to lead the fight to save liberty, even if it
was at personal expense . 11
It would appear, therefore , that Cice ro's ostensible motivation was to rescue and
restore the Republic. Everitt emphasizes that Cicero was the right man for the job . He
was one of the few senior statesmen who had su rvived recent political tu rmoil, therefore
representing "the best of the past. "12
He was known for advocating peace and reconciliation th roughout h is career.
He also possessed the expertise , both admin istrative and rhetorical , to regain his old
political influence. Everitt alludes to a personality sh ift that exhibited a new
"ruth lessness and clarity" which could have been due to his advanced age and an
attitude of having noth ing to lose. Eve ritt also suggests that Cicero's years spent
read ing and writing ph ilosophy might have helped him clarify his priorities. Therefore ,
the Cicero who retu rned t o politics was in effect a new person who was now wil ling to
use "u nscrupu lous and even unconstitutional methods" to ach ieve h is goal: "the fu ll,
complete and permanent restoration of the Republic."13
Syme, no partisan of Cicero's, provides a fresh perspective on Cice ro and his
attacks on Marcus Antonius. He bel ieves that historians rely too m uch on the Philippics,
and that the lens should be adjusted without their influence . 14 In Syme's opinion,

10
11
12
13
14

Thomas N. Mitch e l l , Cicero, the Senior Statesman (New Haven: Yale U P , 1 99 1 ) 299.
Frisch 9.
Anthony Everitt, Cicero: The Life and Times of Rome's Greatest Politician (New York: Random House, 200 1 ) 287.
Everitt 287.
Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (London: Oxford U P , 1 95 1 ) 1 05.
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C icero's last year, although "fu ll of glory and eloq uence", was a disaster for Rome .15 To
Syme, Cicero's political judgment was frequently q uestionable. 16 Syme's criticism of
Cicero and his motives is damning. He accuses him of exhibiting a fanaticism u pon his
retu rn to Rome in 44 that could only have been a result of the memory of past
" h u miliations": his exile, the role he was forced to play d u ring the First Triumvirate as a
pu ppet of the despots, and later Caesar, defending people he despised , his
miscalculation in siding with Pompey d u ring the civil war; and, finally, according to
Syme, "the g uilty knowledge of his own inadeq uacy . " Syme accuses Cicero , although

·

g reatly talented , of having done much less for the Republic d u ring h is career than his
speeches professed . Cicero also knew that he should never have left Rome after
March 1 7 , when h is talents might tru ly have served to bring about "concord and ordered
government."1 7 Instead , he deserted Rome, vacil lating about what to do, as was h is
wont. Syme states that by the time he returned in the autu m n , it was too late. When he
finally decided to join the fray, he incited what Syme calls "the most irrational of all civil
wars , " instead of working towards some kind of peace . 18
There is no q uestion that the Philippics exhibit a conti n uous escalation in
Cicero's anger and hatred towards Marcus Antonius and a certain in creased fanaticism
in h is style. There is an almost manic tone in some of the Philippics, and Frisch
believes that Cicero was a "man ia-depressive <sic>" character. 19 Therefore , it is
essential to investigate how Cicero came to be on his second th reshold of g reatness in

15
16
17
18

19

Syme 4 .
Syme 1 42 .
Syme 1 44.
Syme 1 39.
Frisch 1 5 .
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44.

The clues lie in the career that created the man who, at the age of 63, was wi lling to

take on this dangerous challenge.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND/POLITICAL E R RORS?
CICERO'S CONSULSHIP AND CATILINE

. Cicero was born in Arpin um in 1 06 . He was an eques, a novus homo, not born
to the a ristocracy and, therefore , his rise to power at Rome in his ea rly career took extra
effort and cleverness since he could never be accepted as one of the true optimates,
the properly born ruling class. N onetheless, he ran through the cursus honorum and
u ltimately became consul in 63. 2° F rom that point o n , his political career is fraught with
indecisive and q uestionable choices, several of which seem to have been reached
because he put his ego before common sense; others because, although extremely
bright and clever, he d id not possess the savvy and innate ruth lessness of a true
politician. It has been suggested that, had he been born in another era , C icero would
have lived h is life in an ivory tower outside the political a rena, read ing, writing and
teach ing philosophy and law. 21 However, th is was not a possibility in Cicero's lifetime
and the route that he traveled , although more ard uous for an eques, was the expected
cou rse in order to ach ieve success. H is own philosophy speaks of the ideal statesman
and h is responsibilities to the people and the state . Nonetheless, there appears to have
been a certain naivete in C icero's th inking, probably beca use he believed in the in nate
goodness of man. 22

20 E l izabeth Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait (Ithaca: Corne l l U P , 1 983) 6 1 .
2 1 Frisch 1 5 .
22 Dickinson 46.
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C icero's consulship became famous for h is very successfu l suppression of the
Catilinarian conspiracy. The decision that came back to haunt him throughout the rest
of his life was having the conspirators executed without trial, a u n ilateral power inherent
in the Senatus consultum ultimum. Cicero considered his actions d u ring his consu lsh ip
as the g reatest ach ievement of his career and they were celebrated by all, giving him
the title pater patriae for having saved his cou ntry. However, several years later he paid
for that decision with exile and , even after his retu rn , frequently felt compelled to defend
h is actions. He insisted that, although he had been given the power to decide how to
defend the Rep ublic, he had consu lted with the Senate before taking action and had
been backed by them . 23 I n terestingly, in the debate d iscussing the fate of the
conspirators , J u lius Caesar advocated life in prison or exile, wh ile Cato the Younger
a rg ued strongly for the death penalty. 24
Rawson , in her biography of C icero , says that from the moment Cice ro's
consulship ended , Cicero's political life became a political fa ilure . 25 She criticizes his
desire for consta nt praise but recog n izes that a novus homo would have more need for
this, since dignitas and pu blic recog n ition were not automatically his. However, she
states that Cicero was incapable of holding h is tongue and, therefore , made people
believe that he lacked the gravitas for leadership . Cicero also needed to keep
reminding Rome of the role he had played d u ring his consulship to ward off
repercussions from h is execution of the conspirators . 26 His actions d u ring his
consu lsh ip certai n ly prove that gravitas was not an issue. However, despite h is justified
23 P l ut. , Cic. 20-21.
24 S uet., /u/. 1 4: S a l l . , Cat. 51.
25 Rawson 89.

26

Rawson 9 1 .
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pride in the actions he believed had saved h is cou ntry, he was correct that h is treatment
of the Catilinarians would return to bite him.

CICERO, THE BONA DEA SCANDAL A N D CLODIUS: DUBIOUS CHOICES?

U nfortu nately for C icero , his next political error im med iately followed his
consulship. I n 62 B . C . , the famous Bona Dea scandal occu rred . The mysteries of the
Bona Dea , a strictly female religious rite , were celebrated annually at the home of the
wife of the pontifex maximus who, at the time, was J u l ius Caesar. The perpetrator,
Publius Claudius Pu lcher, later known as Clod ius, was a rather d issolute young man, a
member of a g roup of similarly inclined youths. H uzar say that Marcus Antonius may
also have been a member of this g roup of youths that Cicero had once d u bbed the
'Catiline set.'27 C lodius was p u rported to be havi ng an affair with Pompeia, Caesar's
wife . Disgu ised as a woman, Clod ius managed to crash the pa rty but was d iscovered
and fled . However, he was recog nized , identified and, in 6 1 , brought to tria l. 28 Although
g u ilty, he managed to bribe the j u ry and was acqu itted . His defense was that he had
not been in Rome on the date of the ceremony. C icero , however, had seen him on that
day in Rome because C lodius had come to visit h i m . Epstein bel ieves that that visit is
proof of an ongoing early friendship between C lodius and Cice ro . Nonetheless, Cicero
ultimately decided to testify against Clodius, destroying h is alibi. 29
C icero's role in the aftermath of that scandal was really u n necessary, another
poor pol itical decision that cost him dearly. Although he later claimed moral outrage,

2 7 Eleanor Goltz H uzar, Mark Antony,

28
29

a Biography (Minn eapolis: U M i n n Press, 1978) 19-20, 37.
Tatu m , J . " C icero a n d T h e B o n a Dea Scan dal." CPh 8 5 (1990) 202-208; 202.
Epste i n , D. "Cicero's Testimony at the Bona Dea Tri a l ." CPh 81 (1986) 229-235; 233.
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Cicero's early reference to C lod ius' sacrilege had an amused rather than offended
tone. 30 However, although he states that a friendship once existed between the two
men, Epstein believes that Cicero still harbored d istrust and resentment against C lodius
for the p u rported con nection between Clodius' and Catili ne's supporters in 63. 31
Alternatively, Plutarch says that at some point C lodius may even have acted as one of
Cicero's bodyg uards. Cicero claimed that he had actually opposed bringing C lodius to
trial u ntil the last min ute and had only assisted the prosecution half-heartedly. 32 Epstein
states that Cice ro believed that it wou ld have been better for C lodius to carry the stain
of h is sacrilege rather than be exonerated by a corrupt j u ry. 33 In any event, there was
no political enmity or strong reason for C icero to have involved himself against Clod ius
in the resu ltant prosecution of the affair.
Tatum says that C icero's consulship and Cicero h imself became necessary to
the prosecution of C lodius because h is actions d u ring the Catilinarian conspiracy made
Cicero the "vital sym bol of senatus auctoritas." 34 This may have been good press for
Clodius' enem ies who were pushing for a trial, but still not an explanation for C icero's
personal involvement, a lthough th is ego-stroking was probably very intoxicating and
alluring to him.
C icero would certainly have d isapproved of Clod ius' behavior d u ring a solemn
religious rite , especially d ressing as a woman and comm itting sacrilege. 35 Cicero late r
referred to h imself as a champion o f senatus auctoritas for testifying a t the tria l a n d
30 Epstein 230; Att.1.12.3.
3 1 Att.1.14.5; Epstein 230.
32 Att.1.16.1-2.

33 Epstein 231-232.

34 W. Jeffrey Tatum, The Patrician Tribune Publius C/odius Pulcher (Chapel Hill: No.Carolina U P ress, 1 999) 77.

35 Tatu m , 208.
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viewed C lodius' acq u ittal as a travesty of justice that cast aspersions upon the
'monu ments' of his consulship . 36 He claimed to have acted to restore the health of the
Republic. Once again , however, his motives for involving himself in that circumstance
deserve investigation .
Plutarch says that Terentia, Cicero's wife , may have been jealous of Clodius'
sister, Clodia Metelli, believing that Cicero was attracted to her and may have even
wa nted to ma rry her. His testimony against C lodius would prove to Terentia that her
suspicions were u nfounded . Plutarch suggests another intrig uing scenario for Cicero's
involvement. Terentia's sister, Fabia, a vestal virg i n , may have been prosecuted by
Clodius for having relations with Catiline, a capital crime for the priestess . In any event,
Plutarch states that C icero's testimony demolished C lodius' alibi. 37
It is possible that there were other more personal, career related, motivations for
Cicero to volu nteer h is services at trial. Cicero, as a novus homo, was always aware of
his inferior status among the cream of pol itical society and sought ways to ingratiate
himself with them. 38 Clodius had many enemies among the better people and Cicero
knew that siding with them m ight elevate his status. Tatu m suggests that Cicero did not
fear C lodius in any way as a political opponent or he might have reconsidered his
involvement in the affair. Tatum concludes, however, that Cicero probably d id not wish
to destroy Clodius. He genu inely bel ieved him to be guilty of a serious crime against
society. Therefore, he was motivated more by u nselfish civic responsibility and loyalty

36 Tatum 205.
37 Plut., Cic. 29.
38 David Stockton,

Cicero: A Political Biography (London: Oxford U P , 1 97 1 ) 1 6 1 .

12

to the senate's authority than by political self-promotion. 39 Some h istorians suggest that
Cicero's testimony against Clodius constitutes ingratitude if indeed Clod ius had backed
C icero against Catiline. 40
There are only two genuine defenses for C icero's testimony: either Clodius'
actions offended his moral sense , or his belief that C lodius had been a Catiline
sympath izer. H owever, by the time of the trial, Cicero was no longer in the spotlight at
Rome and this was unacceptable to the man who had once saved h is cou ntry and
basked in that g lory. He needed to elevate h imself once aga in among those whose
influence and approbation he sought. Th is was a golden opportu n ity to turn the eyes of
Rome to a man who was rescu ing her yet again, this time from moral turpitude.
Cicero's motivation m ust have been unimportant to Clod ius who remained h is
enemy throughout the latter's lifetime. C lod ius wanted only to be acq u itted wh ile C icero
presented h imself as the defender of senatorial authority. 41

CICERO, REJECTION OF A JOB OFFER AND EXILE: SELF-IMPOSED PROBLEMS?

By 59, beca use of h is political ambitions, C lodius, with Caesa r's help, had been
adopted by the plebeian branch of his own family in order to legally ru n for tribu ne, a
position not open to patricians.

He became tribune of the plebs in December 59. 42

Just prior to this time, Cicero had declined becoming the fou rth member of what evolved
into the First Triu mvi rate of Caesar, Pompey and C rassus. Cicero considered th is
alliance a betrayal of the Roman constitution and rule of law. Everitt calls th is the
39 Tatum, 207-208.
40 W.K. Lacey, Cicero and the End of the Roman Republic (New York: Barnes and Noble,
4 1 Lacey 54.
42 Rawson 1 1 3 .

1 978) 53.
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turning point o f C icero's career. 43 He h a d rejected power for idealism . C icero had
sealed his fate . The triumvirs no longer supported C icero's presence in Rome where he
still wielded influence in the Senate . 44
C lodius was now Caesar's man . After Cicero had tu rned down Caesar's offer to
share power, Cicero now rig htly fea red C lodius. 45 I n late 59 and early 5 8 , C lodius used
that fear to manipulate him into backing bills that Cicero would have considered
"pern icious . " Clodius was obviously promising to protect and spa re Cicero in return for
th is assistance . 46 C icero could not have approved of the restored right to associate in
clubs or collegia , especially since he had been part of the Senate six years earlier when
they had been banned . He also would not have approved of C lodius' motion to red uce
the power of higher mag istrates, nor his measu re for free grain d istribution to the
people. 47 Wh ile he had been true to his convictions when refusing to support the F i rst
Triumvirate , he appeared suddenly to have abandoned the welfare of the State to save
h imself from any retribution Clod ius could th reaten.
It wou ld seem , however, that C lodius was playing cat and mouse with Cicero
because, in late January or early February of 5 8 , Clodius introd uced a bill, re-enacting
an older law, which den ied fire and water to anyone who had put citizens to death
without a tria l . It is more than possible that he was enco u raged in th is by Caesar who
needed Clodius' backing so that Caesar's laws of 59 would not be a n n ul led . Cicero
knew that this action was d i rected at h im and his consu late and cou ld fi nd no one to

43 Eve ritt 321 .
44 Rawson 1 3 1 .
45 Rawson 1 1 1 .

46

Rawson 1 1 3 .
1 1 1 -1 1 3 .

47 Rawson
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help him. Caesar's explanation for h is inability to intervene in Cicero's behalf was the
fact that he had always disapproved of the Catilinarian executions, and had vehemently
spoken against them at the time.48
Th is was a desperate time for Cicero and another turn i ng point in h is life. As he
looked around Rome, he realized that even those who p u rported to be on h is side d id
not have the power and influence to change his fate . They, too , were living in a
changed Republic and were more interested in their own political survival . They were
u nwilling to challenge the new triu mvirate in Cicero's behalf. C icero could have waited
to see how events would cu lminate, but he knew that it was u n likely things wou ld turn in
his favor. So he was forced to leave Rome before he was officially exiled . For eighteen
months, he lived in a near su icidal depressio n , on the verge of a breakdown .49
Pompey is the worst offender in this scenario. I n several of his letters to Atticus
prior to his u ltimate decision to leave Rome, Cicero voices confidence in his fellow
consu lars and especially in Pompey as a loyal defender of his interests . "Pompeius
tells me not to worry about Clod ius, and expresses the most cord ial sentiments towards
me in everything he says. " 50 However, Pompey did nothing to help Cicero except to
g ive him vague reassurances and in the end tacitly al lowed the exile to happen.51
Cicero could have anticipated C lodius' revenge as well as h is politica l reasons for
sending him into exile. Caesar was no real friend to Cicero , especially after Cicero had
clearly shown his opposition to the triumvirate's plans . Therefore , he could not have
expected m uch support from Caesar. He might even have accepted the lack of action
48 Rawson
49 Rawson

1 1 4-1 1 5.
1 1 8.

50 Att .2.24.5 .

51

Cicero, Letters to Atticus, Vol. I. Tra n s . D . R . Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge: LCL, 1 999), intro. 7 .
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b y m a n y o f his fellow senators who were protecting thei r own pol itical futures. He cou ld
never have predicted Pompey's betraya l , especially since he had always idolized
Pompey and treated him with g reat defe rence.
By May 5 8 , Cicero was in exile. He had left of his own accord knowing that the
exile was inevitable without Caesa r and Pompey relenting in their positions. H is
decision to leave was h u miliating , costing him the prestige and auctoritas he had earned
from h is years in public life. 52 Upon his departure , Clod ius proposed another bill
condemning C icero whereby all of his property and goods were confiscated .
Su bsequently, his mansion in Rome was bu rned to the g round and his Tusculan villa
looted . Clodius even accused Cicero of having invented the evidence that condemned
the Catilinarian conspirators. Cicero h imself was forbidden to come with in 400 miles of
ltaly. 53
Cicero was finally recalled by the Senate in Aug ust 57, although he was never
exonerated of Clodius' charges nor were Clodius' bills repealed . Cicero's actions were
simply exempted from those laws . 54 Although he was a somewhat broken man, the
reception he received from the people and h is colleag ues upon h is retu rn did much to
lift his spirits . He began to bel ieve that his retu rn might bring a return of order and
legality to Rome , a m istaken assumption . 55 Shackleton-Bailey points out that Cicero's
egotistical response to his triumphant welcome home soon alienated him from some of
the senatorial leaders . He seemed to view the triumphant g reeting he received upon his
retu rn as proof that he tru ly was ind ispensable to Rome . Th is attitude angered and
52
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disappointed many people who bel ieved that Cicero should have retu rned a more
cautious man, having been properly chastised by the powers that be . 56
Cicero qu ickly learned that not everyone was as exh ilarated by his retu rn as he
had assumed . The Senate had made restitution to Cicero and his family for the
confiscation of property by paying for the construction of a new home for Cicero and
another for h is brother Quintus on the Palatine. Clodius was apparently guilty of
sending men to both sites to interrupt construction and vandalize the properties. Cicero
was su bseq uently assau lted on the Via Sacra . 57 Evidently, C lodius' enmity for Cicero
had not abated in spite of his positive reception from others . H uzar opines that Antony,
at the time still a confederate of Clodius, may have been involved in the destruction of
the property. 58
Indeed , exile had changed C icero . He now lacked confidence, was unsure of his
place in Roman society, and did not have a clear view of the political scene in Rome .
He claimed not to be happy with Rome or with himself and he was helpless to remedy
his situation . 59 Shackleton Bai ley says that he briefly tried to stay politically independent
and take advantage of any rifts he saw in the triumvirate , but their pact was reinforced
at Lucca in 56. 60 Pompey then warned him to watch h is step. 61 He had learned from
hard experience that h is best choice was to stay out of trouble and hope that things
would change. D ickinson states that Cicero hated h imself for having to make th is
decisio n , but he should have forg iven himself because he was not really serving the
56 Shackleton Bailey, 74 .
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triu mvirs . Although weakened political ly, Cicero was still extraord inarily brig ht and
astute. He stepped to the side, maintained friendly relations with all of the importa nt
people, took cases he did not necessarily wa nt and occasionally made a speech in
favor of the triumvirate if he believed in what they were doing, as he did in regard to
Caesar's com mand in Gau l . 62 Despite compla ints about h is life at Rome to Quintus and
others d u ring th is time, 63 Shackleton-Bai ley does not believe he was as u ncomfortable
as he made others believe . For him the "labor of pleading was a labor of love ."64 He
probably was having a fi ne time appearing in cou rt and enjoying an active social life .
He was relatively safe since h e h a d removed himself from politics a n d only appeared
publicly at the bar, but not as a statesman. 65 I n a letter to Atticus, he states: " I do not
remember the heig hts from which I fell but the depth from which I have rise n . "66
The triumvirate became shaky. Caesar's daug hter J u lia, married to Pompey, had
d ied in childbirth in 54 , th us loosening the ties holding Caesar and Pompey together.
Crassus' death in 53 was the real death knell. From that time on, Caesar and Pompey
vied for supremacy in Rome. 67
From May 5 1 to Novem ber 50, Cicero was away from Rome as proconsul in
Cilicia. 68 Upon his retu rn to Rome in 49, the situation between Caesar and Pompey had
worsened . Cicero did not know which way to tu rn . Both Caesar and Pompey
considered him a friend. 69 Soon after his return to Rome after his proconsuls h ip, Cicero
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believed that h e might b e able to serve as a negotiator between Pompey a n d Caesa r.
However, th is plan never came to fru itio n . 70

CICERO AND POMPEY, FRIENDS AGAIN: BETTING ON THE WRONG HORSE?

C icero was about to make his next misgu ided political decision. Cicero had
always favored Pompey in spite of the latter's betrayal with rega rd to his exile, since
Pompey had also been very instru mental in Cicero's retu rn . Therefore , the combination
of h is early affection and cu rrent g ratitude made Cicero lean more heavily towards
Pompey. He also believed Pompey less likely to become a tyra n n ical despot than
Caesar. He also m ust have believed that Pompey had a good chance of emerging the
victor in th is civil war. In letters to Atticus, Cicero stated that siding with Pompey was
the best way for him to protect h is own political influence; he also would rather be
defeated with Pompey than victorious with Caesar. 71 He u ltimately decided to support
Pompey, but u rged him to p u rsue a cou rse for peace . As it tu rned out, Pompey did not
desire peace. 72 Even after he ascerta ined this, Cicero gave h is stau nch support to
Pompey and now considered Caesar an enemy.
When Caesar crossed the Rubico n , C icero was terribly d iscou raged . because he
felt that neither Pompey nor Caesa r cared about the welfare of the people of Rome;
they were fig hting strictly to win supremacy. 73 Cicero then hoped that Caesar would
allow him to stay out of politics . At first Caesar apparently not only acq u iesced in, but
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was pleased with , Cicero's lack of involvement. H owever, by March of 49 B . C . , Caesar

•

was u rging Cicero to return to active pol itics in Rome and was becoming displeased
with Cicero's absence . 74 U ltimately, Caesar's u nwilling ness to permit him to remain
neutral reinforced Cicero's loyalty to Pompey, but meanwh ile continued to vacillate , and
sought Atticus' advice as to when or whether to join Pompey. 75
C icero u ltimately decided to join Pompey and began to make plans to leave Italy.
Both Antonius and Caesar strongly u rged Cicero not to do so. Anton ius even made
veiled th reats against Cicero and h is family. Caesar himself wrote to C icero to dissuade
him from this action . 76 Cicero left from Gaeta to join Pompey's troops in June of 49. 77
No one had contact with him for about seven months, when he reappeared in
Thessalonica, the site chosen by Pompey. Eventually, he traveled to Pompey's camp in
Dyrrach i u m . D u ring h is time with Pompey, C icero was frequently ind isposed . On the
day that Pompey left to follow Caesar, a move that ended on August 9 in Pharsalia,
Cicero was once again not well enough to join him. Nonetheless, C icero had cast h is
die with Pompey and he was stuck with that decision u ntil after the Battle of Pharsalus,
the defeat of Pompey and ostensible end of the civil war. 78
I n effect, Cicero was once again exiled from Rome, th is time at Brundis i u m , as a
Pompeiian loyalist. His political acumen had failed h i m . His futu re was in Caesar's
hands. He needed Caesar's len iency, forg ive ness and permission to return to Rome ,

74 Rawson, 1 94; S hackleton Bailey
75 S h ackleton Bailey 1 34-1 55.
76

1 55 .

Aft. 1 0 .8A&B; 1 0 . 1 0 .

77 Shackleton
78 S h ackleton

Bai ley 1 65-1 66;
Bailey 1 67- 1 7 1 .

Att. 7.8.4; Fam.14.7.

20

wh ich was granted in the winter of 48. 79 Once again , h is life at Rome was u nexpectedly
d ifferent and confusing to him. The civil war had taken its toll on so many of his forme r
associates. Caelius, M i l o , Pompey, Bibulus, Cato , among others , were gone. 80 But, a s
h e had before , Cicero displayed a resiliency in character. He strengthened old
friendships and established new ones. 81 He created a new life for h imself in and a round
Rome .
Caesar actually needed Cice ro's support at this point in Rome. As victor, he was
now alone and needed to establish a new order. C icero was one of the few elder
statesmen left, and he had always supported the Republic and the constitutio n . If
Cicero's voice could be heard in favor of Caesar and his policies, Caesar would have an
easier time consolidating his status. Cicero was an ex-consul, a lawyer, an augur, the
author of De Re Publica and , even better, a former ally of Pompey. With his friends and
power of persuasio n , Cicero would be an ideal supporter of Caesar. Early in Caesar's
solo ru le, Cicero may even have deluded h imself into believing that Caesar was still
th inking of restoring the old constitution. 82 Syme viewed that constitution in the context
of the time as a "screen and a sham ."83 Accord i ng to Rawson , there is m uch
d isag reement among scholars as to whether Caesar cou ld have possibly been leaning
in that d i rection . It is just as likely that Caesar had always envisioned a type of
monarchy as h is solution for Rome. 84 The fu ndamental difference between these two
great men was that Caesa r wanted a new gove rn ment, however that fi nally emerged ,
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wh ile Cicero wanted new and better men to ru n the existing one with new and better
laws . 85 Nonetheless , he continued to have influence , socializing with Caesar and h is
circle, d iscussing literatu re and other cu ltu ral topics , and occasionally using that good
will to seek favors for friends. 86 Cicero contented h imself with his idealistic notions of a
perfect state and su rvived well with in the current one.
Yet Cicero's career after his consuls h ip seemed to lead him from one form of
exile to another. He never regained his self-confidence or h is former high status in
public life . He spoke h is mind to Atticus and a few select others but, outside of h is
allusions to the politics of the day in his forensic speeches , he no longer sought the
limelight of the foru m to express h imself. He claimed to be d ishonored by the new form
of government. 87

THE IDEAL ROMAN: A DREAM, ASPIRATION OR SELF-DELUSION?

From 46 to 44, when Cicero retired from public life, he spent most of h is time
writing and had essentially put h imself into vol u ntary exile from politics. 88 In th is quasisolitude, read ing and writing philosophy and other treatises, Cicero cemented h is
thoug hts and opinions about how affairs would be conducted in a perfect repu blican
state . He bel ieved that th rough these political treatises he had fou nd another way of
addressing the Senate to deliver h is message that trad itional political values needed to
be restored . 89 This period in C icero's life immed iately precedes the assassination of
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J u lius Caesar. Th us, it is essential to briefly study how C icero's political and social
ideals developed d u ring th is critical period in order to see how they influenced the
C icero who emerged as a leader after Caesar's death .
I n Cicero's opi n ion , h is contemporary statesmen were guilty of vices that had not
existed in his ideal , the early Roman Rep ublic. They were jealous and possessed by
personal hatreds which promoted d issension and sedition and destroyed civic spirit.
They did not d isplay a p roper sense of responsibility and placed their own priorities
above those of the com m u n ity. 90 I n h is Paradoxa Stoicorum, C icero also criticized what
he believed to be the two most sign ifica nt negative featu res of his contemporary Rome:
the frantic desire for money and possessions and the need for their extravagant
conspicuous spending. The early heroes of Rome were satisfied with praise and glory
for ach ieving their happiness. 91
Cicero believed in a constitutional government that promoted justice and
morality. Men were "born for justice" beca use they were 'amiable' and had the capacity
to reason . 92 Justice is the "fou ndation of common interest and hence of the state . "93
Serving the government was a moral d uty and brought o ut virtus in men. 94 Further,
governments should seek to be loved , not feared . 95
Cicero was very specific about the characteristics of the ideal statesman which
he considered to be the hig hest calling for a citize n . Although unable to fulfill everyth ing
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in every category he set forth , one can be ass u red that in his own estimation , Cice ro
came closer to fu lfilling the ideal th roughout his career than any politician he had known .
The ideal statesman should possess wisdom, both personal and pol itical.
His life shou ld be one of moderation with h is passions held in check. He m ust believe
above all in justice and , therefore, lead h is life with honor and integ rity as an example of
excellence in h is life and character. B ribery and corruption should not be able to entice
him because he is satisfied with a love for glory. He must d isplay manliness, cou rage
and generosity, and make himself easily avai lable to his fellow citize ns, always working
seriously and energetically. He should possess excellent public speaking skills for
persuasion . H is leadership skills, both civic and military, should be exemplary. With all
of that, fortuna was essential , because without good luck, success could not be
assu red . 96
The ultimate goal was the preservation of the state, the maintenance of law and
order, and defense against external th reats. 97 Above all, C icero bel ieved in the
concordia ordinum, a harmonious cond ition of the social classes govern ing themselves

th rough a mixed constitution where equality was reached essentially th rough a caste
system. H owever u nfai r th is may seem in the context of our own view of democracy,
Cicero was convinced that the laws of Rome were "consonant with the laws of natu re , "
covering religious, social a n d moral values. 98
I n De Officiis, Cice ro stated that there was noth ing more u nworthy in a state
governed by laws than to depa rt from the laws and that the essence of tyranny is
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lawlessness. 99 Since man is only h uman, to find one with all of the above
characteristics wou ld be impossible. Therefore, Cicero believed that politics was best
conducted by elder statesmen who were less susceptible to temptation . 100 When
Cicero retu rned to his leadership position in the tu rmoil following Caesar's assassination
he was 62 years old, the perfect age for fu lfilling his vision of the ideal statesman .
It is d ifficult to d isag ree with C icero's critics who call his post-consular career one
of disappointments and h umiliation . It was also one of comparative political inactivity
and indecision . Were it not for his letters to Atticus and others, he would not have been
as visible to history because he was not, thereafter, a critical cha racter in the ensuing
events. However, th roughout his correspondence, he always seemed to wa nt to be
more active and involved and, by blowi ng the occasional horn , to appear more
important than he actually was . N onetheless , so many of his later letters a re written
from places other than Rome, that he obviously spent a g reat deal of time away from
the city. He never forgot h is glory days when he had been the savior of Rome . He
m ust have reg retted h is inability to recreate that status in his life.
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LIFE AFTER DEATH: CICERO, PRE-PHILIPPICS AFTER THE IDES OF MARCH

Then , finally, in the five months after Caesar's assassination , C icero's outside
involvement with the three major factions that would u ltimately lead to civil war and the
end of the Republic, d rew him out of an almost twenty-yea r near retirement from active
politics to u ndertake the most reckless and dangerous action of h is entire career.

CICERO AND THE TYRANNICIDES: A NOTHER BAD WAGER?

On March 1 5 in 44 immed iately following Caesar's assassinatio n , Marcus B rutus,
with bloody dagger in h is hand , shouted o ut C icero's name. Cice ro had been neither a
participa nt nor a conspirator in th is deed . However, his consistent opposition to tyra n ny
and h is devotion to the constitution and preservation of the Republic had made him a n
inspiration for the men who had decided to end Caesar's reign . 101 To them , he
person ified the Rome they hoped would be re-established . The conspirators had
judged Caesa r a tyra nt who was prepared to be king and they had decided to become
the Republic's liberators .
U ntil Caesar's death , C icero had mai ntained a very cordial relationship with the
dictator. They shared their writing with each other102 and, in December of 45, Cicero
enterta ined Caesar at Puteoli. 103 Yet Cicero immed iately approved of the actions of the
Liberators on the Ides of M a rch and was willing to act in their behalf to preserve their
safety and maintain their status in Rome.
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However, their strategy seems never to have gone beyond the deed itself. As
Cicero wrote to Atticus from P uteoli in May of 44, "That affair was handled with the
cou rage of men and the policy of ch ild ren . "104 The e rrors in action and judgment began
immediately upon the completion of their task. The tyrann icides never proclaimed their
deed an act of heroism that rid the state of a tyrant and restored its liberty. 105 They
seemed to assume that the people would simply recog nize that they now had a choice
in government, and would be gratefu l for or forgetfu l of the necessary m u rder. 106 The
liberators' lack of foresight permitted them to bel ieve that no one would try to prevent
the Republic from retu rn ing to its pre-Caesaria n days . The constitution would return to
its intended functions and the Senate would re-assume the power it had lost. 107 In
reality, the conspirators could never have restored what had existed prior to the civil
war. The Republic had really become a pipe d rea m , a wisp of its original g reatness ,
wh ich cou ld only exist in d reams and memories.
The collaborators also erroneously bel ieved that J u l ius Caesa r represented the
only obstacle to the liberty of the people and, upon h is demise, it would rematerialize in
perfect form . 108 Therefore , the conspirators had decided not to kill M a rcus Antonius
along with Caesar, someth ing Cicero came to rega rd as their most serious mistake. 109
Antonius' reputation and actions had caused them to believe that he lacked the qualities
that wou ld make him a genuine th reat to step into Caesar's role. 110 I n add itio n , for the
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assassins, the m u rder was almost a sacred ritual that went beyond pol itics, symbolizing
the cleansing of the Republic. 1 1 1 Accord ing to Appia n , B rutus declared that he and h is
collaborators cou ld only win the glory of the tyra n n i cide with the death of Caesar alone.
I ncluding Antonius in their plot would have subjected them to accusations of private
enmity and minimized the sanctity of their action . 112
C icero knew that if ever there were to have been a chance for events to tu rn in
favor of the assassins, they would h ave had to summon an immed iate meeting of the
Senate . Cicero enco u raged them to do this on March 1 6 . Since the consul, Marcus
Anton ius, had fled , B rutus and Cassius as praetors had the legal rig ht to call that
meeting. 113 It is surprising that they decided against this because they had always
believed that their command of a majority of the Senate who wou ld approve of the
assassination and help them re-establish an appropriate government was assu red . 114
Cicero cou ld not convince them to actively fight any Caesaria n opposition , especially
Antonius. 115 On March 1 6 , Marcus Brutus did attempt to talk to the people, but h is style
was too d ry and u npersuasive to reach them . According to a letter dated May 1 8 , 44 ,
C icero had received a copy of that speech which B rutus was ed iting for publication .
Although respectfu l of their d ifferences in oratorical styles, Cicero was critical of its
content, mentioning that he had offered to write someth ing for Brutus that he thought
would have worked better. 116 The assassins then retreated to the Capitoline. They
wa nted to negotiate with Antonius, whom they bel ieved to be the legal and rig htfu l
111
112
1 13
1 14
115
116

Everitt 272.
A p p . , B. Civ. 2 . 1 1 4 .
Rawson 260.
Frisch 51 .
Syme 1 83; Boissier 3 5 1 .

Att. 1 5 .1 a.

28

cons u l , even though he had essentially been appointed by Caesar. 117 They had chosen
to deal with the person that Caesar's death had made the strongest mil itary and pol itical
man in Rome. 118
I n itially they proposed that the Caesarians join them on the Capitoline to plan for
the future. They approached the matter as if they had the upper hand, prom ising that all
positions and other rem u neration that his followers had received from Caesar would be
considered 'authorized gifts. ' They accomplished noth ing. 119
Although he had fled , Antonius was not sitting id ly by waiting for events to u nfold .
He recognized his own powerful position and wa nted to p rotect it. On March 1 6 ,
Anton ius visited Calpurnia, Caesa r's widow, i n order to obtain from her fou r thousand
talents and Caesar's papers . The papers would make it appear that projects Antonius
u ndertook or decisions he made were backed up by previous memoranda of Caesar.
He also took 700 million sesterces from the Temple of Ops . 1 20
On March 1 7 , Anton ius called a Sen ate meeting at the Temple of Tellus close to
his home, still unsure of h is own safety. H uza r says that Caesar was still "master of
state" at that meeting and that Antonius, as consul, established his domination of the
state . 121 Antonius was extremely clever in his manipu lation of th is session . He
managed to appear concil iatory without diminishing Caesar's former status. He
therefore p roposed a comprom ise whereby all of Caesar's acts would be approved .
then pointed out that if Caesar were to be considered a tyrant, all of his appointments

117
118

119

120
121

H uzar
H uzar
Frisch
H uzar
H uzar

48 .
80.
49.
83.
84.

He

29

would be nullified and illega l, causing many of the members of his audience to lose their
cu rrent positions and th rowing the Empire into d isorder. Since that decla ration could
not be made without causing tremendous turmoil, Anton ius proposed that the
conspirators go u npunished , b ut also u npraised . It was also decided that Caesar's will
should be read and a public funeral held for Caesar.

As a result of the amnesty and

compromise, all of Caesar's acts and his party survived as if he were still al ive and the
liberators lost their only chance of ever holding sway over the Senate aga i n . 1 22
H owever, early o n , Cicero was thrilled with the resu lts of the March 1 7 meeting.
He praised Antonius and felt that the best resu lts had been ach ieved through the
amnesty and was responsible for preventing a possible civil war. 1 23 Antonius had
remained polite and cou rteous to everyone, an attitude which he projected for months
even though relations were becoming strained. 124 Cicero decided to leave Rome and
return to P uteoli where he could keep tabs on events from a distance . It is d ifficu lt to
u nderstand how Cicero did not view the Ides of March and its aftermath as an incipient
crisis at Rome and how he could believe his presence was no longer needed . Th is very
well co uld have been his real opportun ity to step in to preserve what was left of the
Republic. At that moment in h istory, he was on good terms with all sides. Antonius
seemed pliant and available. The tyrann icides were still in Rome, anxious to repair any
rifts and continue in their roles as lead ing citizens. Cicero's departure , particularly
before Caesa r's fu neral, is at odds with his own view of the appropriate role of a senior
statesman in a state that needed help.
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Perhaps because his name had been shouted out immed iately following the
m u rder, Cicero believed that by staying he might be too closely associated with a deed
that d id not belong to h i m , especially if he lent too m uch support to its perpetrators.
Perhaps he had g rown accustomed to a less active role in politics existence and was
not ready to take on a larger role other than that of an ally to the Republican cause.
Perhaps he trusted that Marcus Antonius, released from Caesar's hold , was genuinely
working towards a concord that included all sides of the issues. In any event, if ever h is
statesmansh ip was needed , it was then and he let an important opportun ity slip th rough
h is fingers .
Caesar's fu nera l was Antoni us' tour de force. He knew that the people loved
Caesar. He, therefore , played on thei r emotions, reminding them that the Senate had
once voted him "all the d ivine and h uman honors at once , " that he had been sacrosanct
and that they had pledged to watch over his personal safety. 125 Antonius had cleverly
a rranged for a wax effigy of Caesar, complete with the twenty-th ree stab wou nds he had
received , to be raised above the already a roused crowd . Mayhem ensued; the Senate
building was razed; the mob went in p u rsuit of Caesar's slaug hterers . 126 The people
had clearly shown the assassins that their lives were no longer safe in Rome . They
were forced to secretly leave town . There was no question that Anton ius had ga ined
complete control. He had removed any fu rther th reat from the tyra n n icides and had
elevated h is own position with the people. 1 27 Anton ius' power now lay in his position
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between Caesar's m u rderers."128 Caesa r was indeed dead, but the Ides of March had
failed . and his "worsh ippers
On April 1 0 , Cicero was still praising the liberators . He pra ised the "heroes" to
Atticus, claiming that they had acted gloriously and that all that was necessary for their
futu re success was money and troops. 129 On April 1 2 , he fou nd Anton ius' interview with
the conspirators satisfactory, but stated that overa ll the only thing that made him tru ly
happy was the Ides of March itself. 13° Cice ro was pleased that Caesar's death was
highly regarded by many as the assassination of a tyrant. H owever, he felt that Caesar
might as well still have been ru ling since no sig n ificant changes had taken place at
Rome. 131

On April 1 6 , Antonius again received praise for the improvement in his

relationship with B rutus. 132 By April 1 9 , however, Cicero had beg u n to bemoan the
inaction of the liberators , condem ning them for not having called their own meeting of
the Senate on the Ides. He had also changed his tone conce rn ing the decisions made
on the 1 ih , in particular allowing the public fu neral held for Caesar. 133 On April 22, he
had beg u n to speak of Anton ius' imprope r use, and probable forgery, of Caesar's
memoranda, and the fact that Octavian had a rrived on the scene to claim h is
inheritance . 134 Cicero was in the perfect frame of mind at that moment to become putty
in the hands of the cu n n ing and u nderestimated young Octavian .
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CICERO AND OCTAVIAN: ERROR IN JUDGMENT OR NESTOR'S AGAMEMNON?

The character of Octavia n was seriously misjudged from the moment he
appeared on the scene to claim h is inheritance . Gaius Octavius, g reat nephew and
adopted son of J u lius Caesar, took on the name Gaius Ju lius Caesar Octavia nus.
Because of the uncertain and potentially dangerous political climate, Octavian's mother
and stepfather tried to d iscourage the youth from leaving home and accepting the
inherita nce. However, Octavian was determ ined to enter the fray and immediately
confront his futu re. 1 35 Considering his later actions at the end of the civil war and h is
u ltimate role as princeps, he must have possessed a g reat deal of charm and the ability
to convincingly d issemble so that no one seemed to sense his genuine feelings and
goals. I t was only later that his innate· intelligence and talent for manipu lation became
apparent.
History shows that Octavian did not emphasize h is relationship to Caesar. He
was clear and resolute about h is ultimate goals and was in no special h u rry to reach
them . He was able to maintain a certain modesty about himself without losing sight of
the end. 136 There is someth ing almost sociopathological about Octavia n's behavior. He
seemed to have had the ability to ignore any social conscience or moral responsibility
towards those with whom he allied h imself from his arrival on the scene up to and
including h is triumviral alliance with Antonius and Lepidus. He could make alliances
and break them, make friends and ultimately sacrifice them . He kept h is emotions, if he
had any, out of his decisions. He had no problem with betrayal because it was exactly
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what he expected o f others. 137 I n the end , he wanted power and glory for h imself and
he was wil ling to play both parties, Caesarian and Ciceronia n , against each other.
Cicero was one of the first people to be won over by the 1 8 year old youth who
appeared at h is home in April , 44 . In a letter dated April 1 9 , Cicero told Atticus that
Octavian had a rrived in Naples, determ ined to accept h is inheritance , but awa re that
Antony might be an obstacle for him. 138 By April 22 in Puteoli, 139 the friendly and
respectfu l Octavian was already with Cicero who , at that moment, was a little wary
about the young man's futu re. He was also unsure of Octavian's entou rage who were
clearly negatively disposed to the conspirators. Octavian could neve r be a bonus civis
because he was too you n g , related to Caesar and su rrou nded by Caesarian zealots. 140
I n add ition , he could never tru ly ally himself with the conspirators and save the
Repu blic. Apparently, Octavian worked on Cicero, flattering his van ity, asking for advice
and Cicero , unaware of Octavia n 's inner strength and determi natio n , viewed Octavian
as a tool to be used against Antonius. Octavian made Cicero bel ieve that he would be
compliant to h is advice and loyal to the repu blican cause. 141 He even convinced Cicero
that he respected and admired the conspirators . 142 Accord ing to Mitchel l , Cice ro
believed that, under h is tutelage, Octavian would be the new leader of the concordia
ordinum after Caesar's death . I n June, Cicero clea rly stated to Atticus that he was not

s u re how m uch faith to put in Octavia n because of his youth , name and family heritage,
and h is ed ucation . Cicero had apparently spoken with Octavia n's stepfather recently
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who apparently did not th i n k very highly of the lad's capabilities . In spite of that opinion ,
Cicero still believed that Octavian needed to be enco u raged and , above all, kept away
from Antonius. 143 N onetheless , C icero's loyalty was clearly bound to Octavian long
before he delivered the first Philippic. I ndeed , C icero's new confidence in h is own
leadership role after September 44 was due in large part to his confidence in Octavian's
loyalty.
Octavia n a rrived in Rome in May 44 intent on claiming h is inheritance. Anton ius,
who was in possession of all of the money from Caesar's legacy, was d ismissive ,
confident that he was dealing with a mere n u isance, someone of no consequence to
h imself. However, confident in the people's affection for his father, Octavian soon made
it clear that he, Caesa r's heir, had been disrespected .

He decided to use whatever

resou rces he possessed to fu lfill the legacy in Caesar's will leaving money to the
people. Caesar's estate included lands that Octavia n proceeded to sell in order to
come up with those fu nds and distribute them . The people saw the effort he was
making and the lack of assista nce he was getti ng from Antonius and h is cohorts. 144 I n
add ition , it now appeared that the money came from Octavian personally rather than
Caesa r's beq uest. 145 Anton ius was well awa re of how Octavian's p u blic activities were
designed to h u rt his reputatio n . 146
But Antonius himself was doing an excellent job of injuring h is own reputation at
Rome. He had su rrounded h imself with a rmed men and then , in June 44 , held a secret
a rmed and guarded meeting in wh ich he changed the assign ments of provinces that
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had been confirmed back in M a rch . 147 Th is move would especially affect Decimus
B rutus who was to be replaced in C isalpine Gaul and moved to Macedonia without his
troops, which would be added to Antonius' when he a rrived in the province148 . In late
April, Cicero revealed Atticus' awareness of the inside mach inations at Rome . Cicero
had learned from Atticus about Anton ius' plans to hold a meeting on the Kalends of
June to effect the provincial reassign ments. 149 On May 24, Cicero, in refe rring to
Antonius' upcoming meetin g , said that his action could incite war if B rutus were
deprived of his province. And on that date, C icero stated that he personally did not
want war. 150
With some o f h i s newly acq u i red fu nds, Octavian decided t o give games in honor
of Caesar. In late J u ly, he p ut together the ten-day Ludi Victoriae Caesaris wh ich also
honored the goddess, Ven us Genetrix, Caesar's ancestor. Accord ing to Appian and
other Roman historians, a comet appeared n ightly in the sky above the games u ntil it
disappea red on the last nig ht. To the superstitious Romans th is was a sign of Caesa r's
divin ity and the clever Octavian immediately cap italized on its sign ificance by placing a
star above the heads of all of Caesar's statues in Rome . 151 Octavian had cut deeply
into Antonius' popula rity and had won the people's trust and affection.
This widespread popularity influenced Octavian to become a candidate for
tribune of the plebs. Antonius could not permit this to happen and violently disrupted
the elections that had already beg u n . He also forbade Octavian from speaking in
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public. 152 I t was clear that these two men could not co-exist with in the Roman
govern ment.
Octavian realized that he was o n his own and had to use his name and money to
get an a rmy, Republican allies and leg itimate backin g . 153 Anton ius was the true soldier
and the loyalty of Caesar's troops had immed iately sh ifted to him after Caesar's death .
However, the a rmy had been outraged by Caesar's m u rder and, accord ing to Appian, 154
blamed Antonius for not having immed iately avenged the crime. They ind icated that
they would be willing to avenge the crime themselves if they could find someone to lead
them . Therefore , Octavian's need for an a rmy coincided beautifu lly with the a rmy's
willing ness to sh ift its loyalty in honor of Caesar.
Octavian and Decimus B rutus both had the money and influence to gather their
own troops, B rutus in Gaul and Octavian in Italy. Antonius and Octavian were now in
competition for Caesa r's men. 155 Octavian had already met with Caesar's troops on his
a rriva l at B rundisium, wh ich was a public declaration that he was more than Caesar's
personal heir but intended to wield political power as well. Octavia n clea rly u nderstood
that Antonius' March 1 7 compromise had not taken the army into consideration. 156 He
offered five h u n d red denarii to each soldier who joined h i m . Antonius, u naware of
Octavian's offer but knowing that he had to sed uce the men to stay loyal to him, offered
only one h u n d red . The result was open m utiny among Antonius' troops which he dealt
with by slaug htering many of them in the presence of his wife , Fulvia. 157 Everitt believes
152 Frisch 1 1 3 .
153 Syme 1 22 .
1 54 App., B. Civ. 3 . 1 2 , 3.32.
1 55 Frisch 1 46 .
1 56 Everitt 280.
157 Frisch 1 46 .

37

that i t was Octavian's popularity with t h e a rmy and, especia lly, with the people that
u ltimately pushed him to detach h imself from close relations with the Senate and set out
to overth row Decimus B rutus in Gau l . 158
The sold iers u nsuccessfu lly tried to reconcile Antonius and Octavian before a
complete rift was effected . 159 However, it would never have been to Cicero's or the
Senate's benefit for the two men to become true allies since that would clearly negate
anyth ing gained from the Ides of Marc h . Cicero became aware of Octavian's active
recru itment and was in favor of it because, by th is time, he had come to view Antonius
as dangerous and desirous of tyra n n ical power. Octavian had started to court C icero ,
u rging h im to join his revolt against Antonius and come to Rome . 160 Accord ing to
Boissier, there were orig inally th ree books of correspondence between Octavian and
Cicero . 161 Boissier emphasizes that Cicero had never approached Octavian to help the
Republic. It had been Octavian who had come to him and he appa rently wrote to
Cicero every day, even calling him "father. "162 Octavian needed Cicero's help in his
mission to overth row Antonius, who was clea rly and legally the hig hest official in Rome.
Cicero did not realize that the u nderlying motive for all of Octavian's actions was his
desire to u ltimately avenge Caesar's assassination by using the Repu blicans, and then
betraying them . 163 Cicero was not ready to return to Rome. He headed for Arpinum,
content in his bel ief that Octavia n would cause trouble for Antonius and weaken him.164
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Accord ing t o Appian , the Senate d i d not trust Octavian because o f h i s money
and soldiers , wisely believing that he would not be content as a private citize n . 165 In the
late autu m n , Octavian wanted the Senate to legitim ize his actions in behalf of the
Repu blic. He claimed to be freeing Rome from Anton ius' tyra n ny. He made an antiRepu blican speech in which he demanded his father's honors and status. Before the
Senate could act on his demands, he learned that Antonius' a rmy was approach ing
Rome. The sold iers, realizing that Octavian wanted to fight Antonius rather than
avenge Caesar's m u rder, would not fight the opposing leg ions. Octavian lost the loyalty
of many of his sold iers at that time. 166 P rior to th is stand , C icero had received a letter
from Octavian offering him leadership in the Rep ublican cause aga inst Antonius. 167

CICERO AND ANTONIUS: AN ENMITY WITHOUT A CAUSE?

Antonius is the most pivotal character in the analysis of what overcame and
motivated Cicero to embark on the road to the Philippics in wh ich he vehemently
opposed and attacked h i m . Cicero's life experiences and decisions certainly shaped
the man who reappeared to energetically g u ide the Repu blic to its ultimate doom. Yet it
is the fig u re of Antonius that seemed to have been the red flag to Cicero's bull. M itchell
and Syme are diametrica lly opposed in their opi n ion of the relationship between the two
men. Syme insists that there was "no ancient g rudge" between them. I n fact, there was
what could have been called a friendship. 168 On the other hand , Mitchell asserts that
there never was a friendship . Cicero had always despised Antonius and found h is
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lifestyle abhorrent and morally d isgracefu l . 169 Therefore, it is essential to examine how
far any history between them m ight have d riven Cicero to what cou ld be viewed as
fanaticism .
Antonius' stepfather, Publius Cornelius Lentulus S u ra, was the ch ief conspirator
along with Catiline at the time of C icero's consulship. He was executed in the
Tullian u m , and it is said that Cicero personally escorted h im there. 170 The
constitutionality of that execution was always in q uestion . However, for Antonius , there
was more involved on a personal leve l . As stated earlier, there is some q uestion as to
whether Antonius h imself was a Catilinarian sympath izer. Even were he not, the
execution of Lentu lus was certa inly a family tragedy. H uzar states that Antonius'
relationship to Lentulus could have engendered bitterness towards Cicero . In addition ,
it may even have sparked the friendship of Caesar and Antonius. 171 Cicero probably
believed that Antonius and some of h is friends were on the sidelines of the Catilinarian
conspiracy. Therefore , Cicero may have resented Antonius for years prior to any
personal confrontations with h im .
Cicero may also have been aware that Antonius had taken part in the destruction
of his and h is brother Qu intus' property. It makes perfect sense that Antonius, because
of his close friendship with Clodius and a need to avenge what he deemed his
stepfather's u n lawfu l executio n , wou ld have gladly participated in this destructive
misch ief.
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The friendsh ip between Antony and C lodius, however, came to a bad end in the
Forum one day after a riot that had probably been incited by C lodius and his cohorts.
Antonius attacked Clod ius with a sword , which caused a permanent rift between
them . 172 After the tussle, Antonius an nou nced that he had felt obligated to avenge
Clodius' spiteful attacks on Cicero . H uzar th inks that Anton ius' statement wou ld have
g reatly am used many in Rome. H owever, there are other likely scenarios for the
conflict. At the time, Caesar was very powerfu l and Antonius was trying to cu rry favor
with h i m . Clod ius had been Caesar's man, but he was becoming u nmanageable. 173
Anton ius may have seen him as a rival for status in Caesar's entourage and, therefore,
used an excuse to weaken him in p ublic. It had also been rumored that Antonius was
havi ng an affair with C lodius' wife, Fulvia, who later married Antonius .
It was probably to Cicero's political advantage t o behave a s if h e trusted the
sincerity of Anton ius' motive , complimenting h im as his "noble and gallant friend . "174
Cicero had been a man without a cou ntry and needed to fi nd a way to exist comfortably
in Rome after his exile. He was probably awa re of Antoni us' g rowing closeness to
Caesar and was trying to erase any remnants of resentment from 63. However,
Antonius' later marriage to the wife of a former enemy cou ld not have sat well with
Cicero , especia lly beca use Fulvia was known to be a strong woman who exerted
tremendous influence on her men . 175

1 7 2 H uzar 3 7 .
1 73 Ibid.
174 H uzar 3 7 .
1 7 5 H uzar 70.

41

Antonius became very usefu l to Caesa r d u ring the civil war with Pompey. On
more than one occasion , Caesar left Anton ius behind to ru le at Rome wh ile he was
away. Everyone m ust have known Cicero's pol itical lea n ings, but Caesar needed h is
presence in Rome. C icero still had tremendous prestige and wielded sig n ificant
influence in ltaly. 1 76 Caesar had left instructions with Anton ius to cou rt Cicero so that he
would willingly stay in the cou ntry. However, Antonius preferred to carouse and,
therefore, never personally approached C icero . I n stead, he wrote him a letter which ,
though claiming devotio n , also contained veiled th reats. He emphasized to Cicero that
Caesar had always done more for him than Pompey. He then made subtle th reats
against Cicero's daughter, Tullia, and her h usband , Dolabella, after wh ich he ordered
Cicero to stay in Italy because it was Caesar's wis h . 1 77
Antonius' behavior was in d i rect contrad iction to what Caesar had commanded
and it d rove Cicero to Pompey. Cicero apparently blamed Caesar's choice of agents as
reason enough not to trust his political aspirations. H uzar judges that Cicero join ing
Pompey was a "well-deserved blow to Antonius" since he had not fulfilled his
responsibility to Caesar. 178
When the civil war was all but over and Caesar had left Rome to p u rsue Pompey,
he again left Antonius in charge, th is time for over a year. 179 Again Antonius was
proving to be a less than perfect leader. With out Caesa r, no elections were held and
Anton ius' relationship with the cu rrent senators , priests and other magistrates had
deteriorated . Anton ius had also been instructed by Caesar to treat the retu rn ing
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Pompeiians with clemency. I nstead , Antonius, who probably had been admon ished for
h is earlier failure, was anyth ing but clement. He would not let Cicero retu rn to Italy,
u naware that Cicero actually had Caesa r's permission to do so. I n add ition, Antonius,
who had not changed his stripes , was still carousing with his actor friends and
frequently making a p ublic spectacle of himself. 1 80
Therefore , under Antonius' less than watchful eye , riots erupted in Rome. Upon
h is retu rn , Caesar was furious with Antonius and pu blicly denou n ced him. Antonius
responded brilliantly by apparently sending an assassin after Caesar. 1 81
C icero must have borne tremendous resentment towa rds Antonius for his
treatment of him d u ring and at the end of the civil war. An incipient grudge was in the
making. I ndeed , Cice ro must have taken a g reat deal of satisfaction from the rift
developing between Caesar and Antonius.
I n his th i rd consulship in 46, Caesar promoted Lepidus as co-consul rather than
Antonius. Although Antonius had failed Caesar th rough his own devices and vices, he
must have believed that h is behavior towards Cicero was one of the seeds of his
problems.
At about this time, in 47 or 46, Antonius ma rried Fu lvia , a woman whom Cicero
considered "cruel and g reedy."1 82 Many agree that she must have enco u raged Antonius
to change his lifestyle because, in 44, Caesar finally named Antonius as his co-
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consul. 183 H uza r even states that, under Fulvia's influence , Anton ius may have beg u n
to resent Caesar's political career and megalomania. 184
Nonetheless , Antonius had become Caesar's most trusted follower. He was
flamen dialis of the cult of Caesar and leader of the Luperci /ulii. 185 And , of cou rse, it

was Anton ius, in the sem i-nude at the Lupercalia in February , who several times offered
Caesar the crown . Although he refused it, "with affected modesty, " Caesar was
considered complicit in this performance and it u ltimately cost him h is life. 186
Cicero was in Rome on the Ides of March . He certainly was aware that, after
Caesar's assassination , Antonius was Rome's legitimate leader. Anto n i us wisely
appointed Dolabella as h is co-consul to avoid any hostilities between h imself and
Dolabella. Caesar had already officially named Dolabella second-in-command at Rome
d u ring his upcoming Parth ian campaig n . The consul Antonius had orig ina lly protested ,
q uestioning the legality of the appointment. 187 H owever, after the assassinatio n ,
Antonius h a d made an excellent political decisio n .
When Antonius h a d recovered from h is i n itial fea r a n d shock immed iately
following Caesar's assassination , he in itially proved himself to be a very competent
consul. Even Cice ro praised some of Anton ius' early actions, such as the abolition of
the dictatorsh ip and strong measu res taken aga inst people who were petitioning for
divine honors for Caesar. Antonius' clever recall of Pompey's son , Sextus , was a stroke
of genius. Appian says th is made the Senate trust and praise h im . 188 Although the
183
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recall of Sextus Cloelius, a henchman of C lodius, was a less than popular move,
Antonius d id write to Cicero politely req uesting his approval of that decisio n . Obviously,
he would have done it anyway but, then at least, Antonius was still seeking the path of
least resistance with Cice ro as an ally. 189
Frisch and Syme agree that Antonius must be viewed outside the confines of the
Philippics to avoid being m isled by C icero's interpretation of events and people. 190 Both

H uzar and Syme compliment Anton ius for his maintain ing calm d u ring the days after the
assassinatio n . He proved that he was a skilled statesma n , demonstrating strength and
stability. 191 H is admin istration of affairs was far superior to that of Caesar d u ring h is first
consulship. There seemed to have been much less violence and corruptio n . 192
Everitt even believes that Anton ius had Republican inclinations , viewing Pompey as the
model for peacefu l supremacy. 193
From the end of April to early June, Frisch points to three centers of energy at
Rome : Antonius, Dolabella and Octavia n . 194 D u ring that same period of time and
beyond, the absent C icero , watch ing affa irs from a d istance, seemed to be conflicted in
his opi n ions and experiencing mood swings in his g rowing agg ravation with Antonius. 195
Frisch says that Anton ius never wa nted to clash with the tyra n n icides, had g reat
respect for Marcus B rutus and was completely behind a compromise . 196 His
su bseq uent actions seem to negate that conclusion and even suggest that Octavian
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might not have been the only d issem bler in th is d rama.

However, Syme somewhat

concurs with Frisch , asserting that Antonius had no q ua rrel with the liberators as long as
they d id not interfere with h is ambition to become the u ndisp uted leader of the
Caesarian party. 197 As it turned out, it was not the liberators who were in control of the
fru ition of Antonius' aspirations. The contest for primacy among the Caesa rians wou ld
ultimately be between Octavian and Anton ius.
Anton ius' instinct to visit Calpurnia and immed iately secu re whatever money and
documents she had was not, in itself, a nefa rious deed . He had inherited the position of
leadership in Rome and had to have whatever was necessary for him to effect a smooth
transition . M itchell mainta ins that Antonius had a fine working relationship with the
Senate. The Senate trusted Antonius soon after Caesa r's demise with broader powers
to publish Caesar's acta than Cicero ind icated in either Philippic 1 . 3 or 2 . 9 1 . 198
However, his later use of those papers comes into q uestion , especially since they came
with the use of Caesar's secretary, Faberius, in whose hand many of Caesar's acta had
been written . Antonius was suddenly in possession of what amou nted to absolute
power and he took fu ll advantage of that position. He g ranted decrees, spent money
frivolously, reca lled exiles who would never have been welcomed by Caesar, and
registered illegitimate Senate decrees. 199 Naturally Cice ro wou ld have become
outraged learn i ng of Anton ius' alleged misappropriation of Caesar's money and acta.
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He also might have been d isag reeably reminded of Antonius' post-civil war p u rchase
and abuse of the m u rdered Pompey's confiscated property. 200
H uzar's interpretation of Anton ius' ambition does not necessarily have to be
taken negatively. She states that Antonius needed to secu re enough power to protect
himself and attain control in o rder to successfu lly govern the empire. 201 Whether
Antonius was d riven by ambition and powerl ust, this was his new and rig htfu l
responsibility. Antonius' performance at Caesa r's fu neral was also in his best interest.
I n add ition to removing the conspirators from Rome, it solid ified concord among the
optimates and underscored the need for the consu ls' controlof the situation. 202

When Antonius left Rome at the end of April to start new veteran colon ies in Italy,
he left Dolabella in Rome. Dolabella contin ued the reconci liation policy that had beg u n
on March 1 7 and, to prove h i s sympathy with the Repu blican cause, took harsh
measu res against Caesa r's partisans. Dolabella's behavior made Cicero extremely
happy. He wrote worsh ipfu l letters to Atticus and to Dolabella, extolling his former sonin-law to such an extent that Atticus apparently scolded him fo r going overboard . 203
It was in June that Antonius' actions became overtly suspicious. He called a
meeting at which very few senators were present, without the req u isite 1 7-day legal
notificatio n . Questionable laws were enacted without auspices being read . This is the
meeting about wh ich Atticus had warned Cicero in wh ich the change of provincial
ma nagement was ratified . In add ition, ostensibly to cover their tracks, Dolabella and
Antonius appointed themselves members of a comm ission to investigate Caesar's acta.
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Perhaps their worst mistake was the passage of a lex agraria , a law that could never
meet with the approva l of the optimates in the Senate . 204 F rom June 1 51 on, Antonius
conducted none of his business t h rough the Senate , but went through the people and
their tribes. 205 Although their actions were viewed by some as tyran ny, u nder the
circumstances, the consuls were constitutionally entitled to wide d iscretionary powers in
the face of crises. 206 For insta nce , Syme maintains that Anto n ius had every right to
order Decimus B rutus out of Cisalpine Gaul and reassign provinces to whomever he
saw fit. 207
As stated earlier, Antonius could never really attain primacy as the Caesa rian
leader as long as Octavian was in the pictu re . Octavian was his competitor for the
Senate, the plebs and the veterans. The Senate was becoming more hostile to
Antonius. While Octavian appeared to be supporting the Republica n cause, Antonius
d ropped any vestiges of a conciliatory pose . Towards the end of C icero's self-imposed
retirement, Antonius appeared to be escalating his violent behavior. He had th reatened
a tribune at the October 2nd meeting which was protected by an armed g uard . He
apparently p u blished a pamph let demanding a trial for Caesa r's killers in which he
included Cicero as an accomplice. He accused Octavian of trying to have him killed .
Cicero believed every negative word he heard about Antonius, especially the news of
the assassination attempt. He was becoming blinded by hatred . 208 Cicero was in
tu rmoil, trying to decide how to respond .
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been in Rome since March 1 ?'h. Accord i ng to Geweke , Atticus's belief that Cicero cou ld
be of genu ine help to B rutus in Gaul finally pushed Cice ro to return to Rome in
August. 209

CICERO'S RETURN: WHAT WAS HE THINKING?

F rom the time he left Rome, Cice ro was a n eager audience for news regarding
the aftermath of Caesar's m u rder. Once again, he was exh ibiting a lmost constant
inconsistency and u n certainty in h is opi n ions about the cu rrent political situation and h is
proper involvement therein . H is letters from this period are those of a fascinated , but
often horrified , observer who believed he had u ltimately made the wrong decision by
abandoning Rome after the Ides of March . Cice ro had strong opi n ions about the
tyra n n icides, stating that the tyrant had d ied but not the tyranny210 and that, perhaps,
Antonius should have been executed along with h is leader. However, in spite of the fact
that Cicero was disappointed in the lack of change in response to Caesar's death and,
later, in Antonius' and Dolabella's reg ime, none of his letters prior to the Philippics
exh ibit the vitriolic hatred he d isplayed towards Antonius th roughout those speeches. I n
fact, it was not u ntil Cice ro had retu rned to Rome i n late Aug ust and encou ntered
Antonius' wrath that his own emotions seemed to spin out of control.
In early April , Antonius was a selfish buffoon not worth worrying about. 211 The
conspirators were glorious heroes who had restored freedom. 212 Octavian might have
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been expected to attempt a coup d'etat. 21 3 Yet, only a few days later, on April 1 2 ,
Antonius and Dolabella had become worrisome u nwanted pro-Caesarian leaders, wh ile
the action of the tyra n n icides, although praised , was proving to be ineffectual. Cicero
was appalled by the apathy of the lead ing citizens in Rome , and pleased to be out of the
political arena. 214 On April 1 61 h , Cice ro was pleased that Antonius had won "even
B rutus' approval , "215 but by the very next day, the quasi designati consules had retu rned
to the roles of tyrants. 216 While he vacillated and blamed everyone else for either their
tyranny or lack of action and involvement, Cicero was entertaining Octavian who was
planning to accept his inheritance. Cice ro was wa rily attempting to judge the young
man's cha racter and value. 217
I n the months that followed , Cice ro contin ued to receive news from Rome that
assu red him that a civil war was in the offin g . This only increased his apprehension and
indecision. 218 Decimus B rutus was joining his troops wh ich made neutral ity impossible.
Therefore, Cicero debated whether to join B rutus or Sextus Pompeius at his respective
military camp or to p u rsue a commisioners h ip in G reece . The G reek post would be
another desertion of Rome and , this time , of Italy. For some reaso n , Cicero believed
that B rutus' decisive move put Cicero's life in danger were he to remain in Italy. He
began to make excuses that his trip to G reece would be for the benefit of h is son
Marcus. Cicero certai n ly seemed concerned about h is own welfa re and su rvival at th is
point.

I ndeed , some aspects of coward ice had entered C icero's musings wh ich , under
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the circumstances was not u n reasonable. A retu rn to Rome would certainly have
embroiled him in someth ing he was as yet u nwilling to face .
Cicero admitted to Atticus that he had beg u n to h u mor Antonius, si nce no other
attitude would have made a d ifference and it was the wiser cou rse of action . I n fact, in
responding to Antonius' letter of April 22 with regard to Sextus C lodius' recall from exile,
Cicero displayed an overly obseq u ious attitude to the consu l , even concluding with the
promise that he would g ladly do whatever was asked or req u i red of him by Anton ius. 219
Then , as d iscussed earlier, he developed a wors h ipfu l attitude towards Dolabella and
what, in G reek, he called h is coup.

220

He continued to ponder where in the world he

belonged d u ring th is upheaval and u n certa inty.
By the beginn ing of May, Cicero reconsidered leaving Italy for G reece on June
1 0 , having learned that Marcus Brutus, rather than attending the Senate on J u ne 1 ,
was contemplating exile. 221 I n add itio n , he had had meetings with Pansa and Hirtius,
the chosen consuls for 43, and was u n impressed with them both as men and as
prospective leaders. He was now more determ ined than ever to flee and leave Rome to
her inevitable fate u nder incompetent incoming leadership. 222 At th is point in time,
Cicero appeared to have reconciled himself to the tyra n n icides' impotence , the
impending civil war, and his not involving himself in any of it.

This might have been the

sanest point in C icero's reaction to the events aro u nd him. Atticus had always
d istanced h imself from the politics of Rome and yet remained a respected Roman
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citizen living abroad . This was a very appropriate decision for a 62 year old man who
had no taste for the military and no impetus to fig ht in the pol itical a rena .
Nevertheless , Cice ro continued to discuss attending the Senate meeti ng on the
Kalends of June, although he had learned that there could be a rmed g uards, defin itely
making the conspirators' appearance there a potential mistake or even disaster. 223 I n
add ition, after a su bseq uent meeting with H i rtius, Cicero seemed more heartened by
H i rtius' attitude since he had apparently made Cicero his arbiter d u ring the present
crisis and in h is su bseq uent consulship. C icero was less trusting of H i rtius' co-consul
Pansa. 224 Nonetheless, one can almost imagine the light of excitement retu rn ing to
Cicero's eyes at the prospect of advising a futu re consu l . Th is position could ru n a
close second to actually holding a second consuls h ip of his own ,
At the end of May, H i rtius, like others , was warn ing Cicero of g reat danger should
the tyrann icides and their sympath izers attend the J u ne 1 meeting. Cicero d id not want
to antagon ize Antonius with his absence which cou ld be taken as a personal offense
and viewed as d isapproval of the consul's success. U ltimately, Cicero decided that his
appearance in Rome would be too dangerous for him. H owever, he was no longer as
positive about leaving the cou ntry. 225
Cicero contin ued to stay in touch with B rutus and Cassius who were insu lted by
the Asiatic corn commission they had been offered . Appian believed that this position
was really a kindness bestowed by upon the two conspi rators since it would
acknowledge them as upstanding citizens, give them the freedom to travel without the
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appeara n ce of fl ight and remove them from danger at Rome. 226 N onetheless , B rutus,
Cassius, Cicero and Servilia, B rutus' mother, were very u n h appy with th is prospect and
Servilia eventually had it q uashed . 227 Cicero ma naged to get h imself appointed to
Dolabella's staff, allowi ng him the freedom to leave Rome and move aro u nd as an ally
of the cu rrent government. 228
After the corn commission was o ut of the pictu re , Marcus B rutus decided to leave
for Asia, rather than risk living in Rome. 229 B rutus had been Cicero's g reatest hope for
repairing and ru n n i ng the Repu blic. B rutus' decision to abandon Rome and Italy had to
have been a blow to C icero, but also confirmation of his own decision to do the same.
On J u ne 20, C icero, reconciled to leaving Rome th rough Dolabella's good g races,
asked Atticus if anyone cou ld seriously view his departu re as a govern mental d uty
rather than a desperate solution to an insolu ble problem . Perhaps the end of his life
would be better because of this move . 230 Yet, in late J u ne , Cicero was still wavering
about whether to go forward with his trip , mention i ng a J u ly 30 1h departu re . 231 I n midJ u ly, C icero had decided to ask B rutus if they could travel together, especially since his
orig inal route th rough B ru nd isium seemed to be blocked by incoming troops. 232
By J u ly 2 5 , Cicero had set forth on the first part of his journey without B rutus,
having decided to head for Brundisium , since the sold iers near there seemed to pose
less of a th reat than the pirates he cou ld encounter on other routes. He bemoaned h is
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departu re from Italy and q uestioned h is own motivation for leaving at that time. He
ass u red Atticus that he would return to Rome by the Ka lends of January, 43. 233
Cicero's next letter is dated August 1 9 . Cicero was just off the coast of Pompeii
retu rn i ng to Italy, having received several pieces of good news. B rutus' and Cassius'
farewell edict, wherein they declared no hostile intentions towards Antonius, preferring
exile to war, had been delivered . They were seeking a meeting with Antonius in the
Senate on the Kalends of September and had invited n u merous proconsuls and
propraetors to attend as well. They hoped to reach a new compromise that would allow
them to retu rn to Rome . Rumor had it that Antonius was amenable to a compromise
that included him relinqishing h is claim to C isalpine Gaul and subm itting to the Senate's
will. 234
C icero also lea rned that he was being criticized for h is decision to abandon
Rome. 235 Apparently, Atticus and B rutus were among those critics , accusing C icero of
abandon ing a sinking ship . Cicero insisted to Atticus that he had finalized his decision
to travel beca use of Atticus' encouragement and that they had both agreed that he
would retu rn by the beginning of the new year. B rutus, with whom Cicero had proposed
to travel , was upset with him for missing the Senate meeting of Aug ust 1 , which gave
the impression that he had permanently deserted his cou ntry for pleasu res such as the
Olympic games. 236 Yet, in spite of h is pleasu re at being missed and desired , Cicero
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insisted that he had definitely not retu rned to participate in politics, in spite of B rutus'
recommendation that he do so. 237
U nfortu nately, on August 1 , at a Senate meeti ng also req uested by Brutus and
Cassius wherein they hoped to be released from their praetorial d uties but allowed to
remain in Rome for the balance of their terms, matters d id not proceed as expected .
Because the meeting purported to b e o n e of peace a n d compromise , many consulars
attended in the hope that the futu re was now secu re . I n stead , L. Calp u rn i us Piso,
Caesar's former father-in-law, delivered a speech in which he verbally attacked
Antonius and h is leadership. 238 He mistake n ly was cou nting on tremendous support
from the retu rned patriots . However, no one offered any agreement to the sentiments
he expressed . Interestingly, neither B rutus nor Cassius were in attendance at that
meetin g , wh ich may have led Antonius to believe that they knew about and tacitly
approved of Piso's outb u rst. Antonius apparently responded fu riously, th reatening
Brutus and Cassius, whose answering 'man ifesto' put an end to all hope of
reconciliation among these men and to C icero's optimistic retu rn . 239
Cicero's next exta nt comm u n ication with Atticus is dated October 24, 44. By this
time, the reluctant politician had jumped back into action with a literal vengeance. He
and Antonius had locked horns, although not in person . I n fact, th roughout the period of
the Philippics, Cicero and Antonius would never clash in person . It is evident that
Cicero had protested too m uch with regard to h is re-entry into the political sphere wh ich
had tempted him since h is desertion of Rome after the Ides of March .
237
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Between the August 1 9 and October 24 letters, C icero had infu riated Antonius by
not attending a Senate meeting on September 1 , complaining of fatig ue from h is recent
journey. Of cou rse, Cicero was not anxious to jump immed iately into open controversy
with Antonius, preferring to watch and wait u ntil he had a better handle on Anton ius'
game pla n . Cicero had also learned of Antonius' intention to propose that an extra day
of thanksg iving, in honor of the divus Caesar, be attached to every public celebration.
Cicero considered that proposal to be sacrileg ious. 240
Antonius th reatened to send housebreakers to Cicero's home to tear it down and
d rag him into the Senate. He also attacked C icero's character d u ring the Senate
debate . 241 Antonius' response to Cicero's absence on September 1 spu rred Cicero into
action and instigated h is speech of Septem ber 2 wh ich came to be known as the first
Philippic.

I n comparison to the speeches that would follow, Cicero held h imself in check
with regard to his attitude and response to Antonius. He was as concerned with
defending his own absence from Rome as he was with attacking and defending h imself
against Antonius. He reminded the Senate of his involvement in the comprom ise that
immediately following the assassination and praised Antonius for h is matu re leadersh ip
in that time of crisis. 242 He reminded the assembly that Antonius had abolished
dictatorsh ip from the State and brought forward several decrees that seemed to
encou rage peace and comprom ise. 243 He commended Dolabella's punish ment of the
Caesar-worsh ipping fake Marius, and stated that, although Dolabella had acted alone,
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he knew that Antonius would have enthusiastically sanctioned and supported his
colleague's decisio n . 244
F rom that point o n , however, Cicero's attitude sh ifted . He condemned Antonius'
J u ne 1 meeting where predominantly u n ilateral decisions had been made, not via the
Senate, but ostensibly through the people. He noted that the lead ing citizens were
apparently too frightened to attend. 245 C icero then excused h is departu re from Rome
stating that he had believed that the next time he wou ld be needed there was on the
Kalends of January when the new regime would take over. 246 But then he heard such
good news regard i ng the sched u led September 1 meeting that he could not help but
wish to return sooner than plan ned . 247
Cicero met with B rutus d u ring his jou rney home only to learn that things were no
longer amicable with Antonius. He also heard about Pisa's speech and , in effect,
condemned the assembly for not having had the cou rage to support him in what, to
Cicero , was great glory. 248 H ad Anton ius not attacked Cicero the previous day in his
absence , perhaps C icero might not have become so defensive of h imself and
supportive of Pisa. However, with his next breath he began to refer to the iniuria
Antonius had inflicted on him the previous day and to defend his absence. He felt pity
for the senators who had been forced to pass a decree with reference to Caesar, a man
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u nworthy of d ivin ity. 249 He then offered tremendous g ratitude to Piso for the speech he
had felt bound to del iver, h owever u npopular that m ight be . 250
Although m uted in tone, the rest of this speech captured th rough inn uendo more
than could have been accomplished th rough accusatio n . Cice ro joki ngly alluded to the
acta that Caesar d id not know he had passed . 251 Men had been recalled from exile by a

dead man; citizenship had been g ranted by th is same deceased person to individ uals
and g roups who had not necessarily been favored by Caesar; exemptions had been
passed by Caesar post mortem to release fu nds. 252 Cicero's beautifu l optative with
reference to the fu nds in the Temple of Ops, "Pecunia utinam ad Opis maneret!", is a
sharp comical aside with the force of a sharpened kn ife . 253
Yet Cicero proceeded to insist that any criticism brought agai nst Antonius was
that of one loyal citizen against the p u blic deeds of another. Therefore , Antonius would
be wrong to view C icero as a personal enemy, and his anger should be tempered by the
public nature of the topics discussed . Also, Antonius, who had taken to traveling a rmed
with a personal bodyg uard , should only employ his arms in self-defense and not against
a citizen merely stating h is concern about matters in the repu blic. 254
Cicero then rem inded Dolabella of his glorious and patriotic handling of the
Marius situation wh ich he should view as h is g reatest moment. In the same vein , he
encouraged Antonius to reca ll h is handling of the meeting in the Temple of Tellus
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following Caesar's m u rder a n d his su bseq uent actions a s his finest hours. 255 Therefore ,
Cicero felt bound to question the motivation for and change in Antonius' actions and
goals. He wondered why power and intim idation were more appealing to Antonius than
praise and love . 256 Cicero contin ued to exhort Anton ius to appreciate how m uch better
it was to be loved than feared .
Although he might have been offended and angry at all of C icero's previous
remarks, the veiled threat that followed m ust have enraged Anton ius. H aving delivered
his friendly , fatherly praise, advice and su bseq uent concern for the abrupt change in
Antonius' behavior, Cicero then reminded Antonius of Caesar's fate . Caesar could not
have been a happy man knowing that at any time someone might have wished him
dead with the hearty approval of many. Cicero, in u rging Antonius to make the people
happy that he had been born , was su btly implying that Antonius was not too far from
bringing the same deserved end to his own life . 257
Although Antonius' speech in reaction to Cicero's is not exta nt, the second
Philippic makes clear its vitriolic content. Antonius had already been angry with Cicero

on September 1 . However, h is carefu lly composed answer, which took h im u ntil
September 1 9 to deliver was a vicious personal attack on Cicero . He ordered Cicero to
be present for the September 1 9 meeting in the Temple of Concord , but the orator did
not attend since he had already been th reatened with Anton ius' enmity after September
2 and he, probably rightfu lly, feared for his life . 258
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PHILIPPIC II: CICERO EXPOSES HIS NECK AND LOSES HIS HEAD

The second Philippic, although b rilliant, is the real turning point in Cicero's
career. It is also the beginning of the lack of objectivity in Cicero that contin ued for the
d u ration of h is leadership and substantially contributed to the end of the republic. It is
particu larly interesting that Cicero never delivered this speech in person even though it
is written as a timely response to Antonius' d iatribe of September 1 9 . Shackleton Bailey
refers to it as a "pamph let in oratorical form supposed to have been delivered in
Antony's presence on 1 9 September."259 J uvenal, in Satire 1 0 , refers to this speech as
the divina Philippica, Cicero's masterpiece . Kingsley Am is' schoolmaster, in Take A Girl
Like You, found this Philippic both boring and fi lled with "nasty silliness."260

C icero had taken his time composing and waiti ng to publish his own vitriolic
response to Antonius. Sussman believes that Cicero had two objectives to accomplish
in the second Philippic: he had to defend his past career, especially in light of Antonius'
attack of September 1 9 ; he also had to dimi nish Antonius's rig ht to Caesa r's status by
"demolishing his motives, methods , character and political career."261 Sussman also
states that rid icu ling an opponent is the most effective way to attack an opponent. 262
Another point that Sussman makes is that Antonius, who was an educated Roman,
probably was a good speaker and, therefore , fu rther inflamed Cicero who proceeded to
attack Antonius' eloq uence among h is other flaws . 263
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Nonetheless, where Philippic I was a reasonable critiq ue del ivered by a very
recogn izable C icero , Philippic II went too fa r and Cicero probably knew this. He did not
have the cou rage to face Antonius and deliver it in person in spite of the fact that he
actually wanted posterity to believe that he had. We know that it did not make a public
appearance u ntil after the October 25 letter to Atticus in wh ich C icero, from P uteoli,
requested Atticus' d iscretion in publishing it. 264
Cicero had not yet assu med the helm of the government nor had he lost hope for
the republic.265 I n fact, on October 2 8 , Cicero was sti ll referring to Dolabella as a vir
optimus even though he was still a nxiously awaiting Atticus' reaction to Philipic 11. 266 I n

the first few days of Novem ber, Cicero was n o more decided about h is role i n Rome's
futu re than he had been for months. Octavia n had been reporting to him about h is
milita ry success and C icero was in even more of a quandary as to how to react and
where to go.267
On November 5 , Cicero was practically giggling with Atticus over some of his
jibes in Philippic 11 268 and, on November 9, he was still seeking Atticus' advice as to
where to go: stay at Arpinum, move closer or return to Rome. 269 By N ovem ber 1 1 ,
C icero , enco u raged by Atticus, was contemplating writin g a h istory and seemed almost
lig hthearted and relatively u n concerned about Rome. 270 I n the final letter of the Atticus
correspondence dated November 1 2 from Arpinum, Cicero expressed personal and
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public d isapproval of Dolabella wh ich he plan ned to share with as many people as
possible. However, again C icero's problem seems more personal than political, as
does h is reaction to it. He was more caught up with financial issues that conce rned
Dolabella and Terentia that would force him to come to Rome. 271 He seemed to be
laug hing a t Octavian's speech g lorifying h is father, rid icu ling the young man's reported
melod ramatic physical gesticu lations. He was almost d ism issive about Octavian's
successes, add ing that he had not yet come to trust him and that he did not believe that
Octavian would have any true va lue to the republic or h imself u ntil after the Kalends of
January. 272 He then reiterated to Atticus that his major cu rrent concerns were fi nancial,
not politica l .
Therefore, almost two months after Anto n ius' verbal attack on h i m , Cicero was
still seeking vengeance for h is h u rt ego. H is firm decision to go forward with the
publication of Philippic II was like that of a vind ictive ch ild. Sussman is certa inly correct
in his analysis of C icero's goals for Philippic II. However, C icero's motivation for
continu ing to feel the need to publicize his own diatribe rather than wo rking for a
peaceful resolution, which had always been h is wont, is the issue here and the crux of
C icero's downfall.
I t is difficult to believe that Cicero contin ued to feel justified publishing this
personal attack on Antonius after he had had a chance to re-read and ed it it. He had
obviously lost perspective and needed to pu blicly lick his wou nds with a fu ll frontal
attack, although he claimed not to have lost sight of who Antonius was and how m uch
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power he wielded . 273 Cicero simply could n ot recover from the accusations and insu lts
Antonius had levied against him: Cice ro was u ng ratefu l to Antonius for having saved h is
life back in 48; Cicero had shown no gratitude towards Caesa r for having g ranted him
am nesty after C icero had supported Pompey; and, especially, that Cicero was involved
in the planning and implementation of Caesar's assassination . 274 I n any event, it seems
foolhardy to have decided to solid ify an enm ity with the most powerfu l man in Rome.
Once Philippic II had been pu blished , Antonius would have had no choice but to
consider Cicero a mortal enemy. It is written as if being delivered in person in the
presence of both Antonius and the Senate. I n th is second Philippic, C icero responded
to Antonius' charges of ingratitude by pointing out h ow g ratefu l Antonius should have
been for the mi ld tenor and impersonal nature of his previous speech, wh ich had been a
beneficium granted by C icero. 275 I n stead , Antonius had chosen to respond with a

personal attack that now begged to be answered in kind with all pretense of beneficium
removed .
C icero q u ickly dispelled the need for respecting Antonius as a consul since , in
C icero's estimation , h is lifestyle and ru ling methods did not merit it, nor had he earned
the title legally. In add ition , Antonius' attack had bel ittled Cice ro's status as a consula r,
especially by bringing up the controversy and events following the Catilinarian
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executions d u ring and after C icero's consulship. 276 Therefore , Cicero launched into a
defense of his actions, rem inding the Senate that he had acted with its approval . He
added that Antonius' beloved stepfather had been a leader among the conspirators . 277
U nfortunately, the Catilinarian conspiracy was not the only incident in Cicero's
past that Antonius attacked .

He had done a perfect job of putting C icero squarely on

the defensive . Antonius implied that Cicero had encou raged the m u rder of Clodius,
which was borne out by h is subseq uent defense of Milo. Cice ro rem inded the Senate
that, years before, Antonius had attacked C lodius in the Foru m and might have killed
him had C lodius not barricaded h imself inside a bookstore. I n add itio n , no one but
Anton ius who was caught up in the present circumstances had ever accused C icero of
complicity in that deed before. 278
Antonius' next alleged exaggeration of h istory was to accuse C icero of causing
the breach between Caesar and Pompey and, therefore , the resu lta nt civil war. 279
Cicero rebutted by stating that it was Caesar who had attempted to sever the friendship
of Cicero and Pompey. 280 I ndeed , Cicero had always u rged peace and reconciliation
between the two men and, had he succeeded, Antonius would never have atta ined his
cu rrent status. 281
I n his determination to vilify C icero , Antonius also made him the orig inator of the
plot to assassinate Caesar. Cice ro immediately turned the tables on Antonius by taking
the false accusation as a compliment, especially since n ot one of the conspirators had
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tried to conceal his involvement in that deed . 282 I n fact, some men who had not
participated had boasted that they were part of the liberation. Cicero went on to
modestly assert that it would diminish their patriotism and deserved glory to take cred it
for having advised such g reat men . 283 He then began to underscore the instances of
Antonius' stupid ity. He bel ieved that B rutus' invoking Cicero's name immediately
following the m u rder proved Cicero's g u ilt. He did not understand that everyone who
considered himself a patriot and approved of the tyrann icides' action was eq ually g u ilty
and equally triu mpha nt. Antoni us' stupor was particularly evident when he declared his
respect for B rutus in the same breath that he accused Cicero of being an accomplice.
He obviously could not make up h is mind as to whether the perpetrators were assassins
or avengers of liberty. 284
Cicero had placed h imself in the perfect position to make a fool of Antonius and
negate his alleged enm ity and hatred for the liberators . If Antonius believed the
conspirators to have been parricides, why had he always spoken of and treated them
with respect? He had permitted Marcus B rutus to leave Rome for more than ten days ,
wh ich violated a statute . He had allowed the Apollinarian Games, which ostensibly
honored B rutus, to be held . He had assig ned provinces to B rutus and Cassius and had
bestowed upon them all of the req u isite provisions and men. I n order to have done
these things, Antonius must have viewed these men as saviors , not m u rderers, and
therefore worthy of rewards . 285 If Antonius could judge these men to be heroes, why
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would Cicero have to fear being cou nted among them? Th us, Cicero expressed his
g ratitude to Antonius for g ranting him such renown . 286
Prior to and d u ring these defensive arg u ments , Cicero had elevated h is own
character and career and had continued to denigrate Antonius'. In an u n rem itting
barrage of insu lts regard ing Anton ius' wit and eloquence , Cicero managed to score
many other points. Antonius' lust, immoral behavior and u nsavory friends, such as the
actress Cytheris and her entourage , were fair game. 287 However, as blunt and cruel as
C icero had intended to be up to that poi nt, it was not u ntil he brought up Antonius'
survival on the Ides of March that the line in the sand was deeply d rawn .
Now that Cicero had made it an approved heroic position to support the
conspirators, he began to tell Anton ius how he would have written the scene. First, he
re n: inded Antonius that it was common knowledge that he had once been approached
by Trebon i us to take part in Caesar' s assassination. Therefore, Anton ius could be
viewed as complicit h imself in the conspiracy since he had both never informed Caesa r
about it and had been d rawn aside by that conspirator outside the meeting prior to the
m u rder. I n add itio n , it was Antonius who had reaped all of the rewards since Caesar's
death . He had emptied the coffers of the Temple of Ops for h is own personal gain . He
had also confiscated all of Caesar's docu ments and had used them to h is own
advantage and had freed h imself from debt. Cicero claimed that he was not accusing
Antonius of killing Caesar, but that he certa inly had to cu rrently be in the company of
men who heartily approved it. In Cicero's scenario, however, Antonius wou ld never
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have gotten these opportun ities since there would have been two hom icides that day,
omitting Trebonius' intercession. 288
Although many other accusations and defenses followed this portion of the
speech , Antonius cou ld have stopped read ing rig ht there and have become incensed
enough never to have forgiven C icero.

Had this speech been delivered in public, this

could have been the point at wh ich Antonius would have jumped up and attacked
C icero. C icero had accused him of conspiracy, d ishonesty, theft, corrupt ambition and,
ultimately, in regretting the fact that Antonius had not been assassinated , had ca lled for
his death . However, literally add ing insult to injury, Cicero contin ued with this personal
assault.
Antonius had somehow become the heir of men he had never known . 289 C icero
add ressed him as "homo amentissime. "29° Cicero claimed that he would never want for
ammunition against Antonius because there cou ld be no end to his vices and
wrongdoings. 291

H uzar states that th is Philippic contained "unsubstantiated irreleva nt

emotional charge against Antonius' public and private life."292 Antonius had been a
homosexual prostitute . 293 He had been in co llusion with C lodius d u ring the latter's
trib u neship and had conspired with him in the destru ction of Cicero's life and, later, his
property. 294 He had come to B ru ndisium and , rather than paying a personal visit to
Cicero , had sent an insulting letter and contin ued to carouse with his actress and
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friends. 295 He had p u rchased and abused Pompey's home, a despicable act in the eyes
of the Roman people. 296 He had the n , in response to being ordered to pay his debts,
sent an assassin after Caesar. 297 And m uch worse , he had decla red friendsh ip for
C icero and betrayed it. In add itio n , u n like Cicero who had been named pater patriae,
Antonius had been declared an enemy of the state d u ring his trib u nesh ip when he
vetoed the motion that Caesar d isband h is a rmy. 298 Therefore , Antonius had provided
the pretext for Caesar to cross the Rubico n , an act wh ich precipitated a catastrophic
civi l war. In Cicero's eyes, the blood spilled in that struggle was on the hands of
Antonius. Antonius was Rome's Helen of Troy, the cause of the state's ru in and
destruction. 299 And , finally, Antonius had premed itated ly caused Caesa r's
assassination by offering h i m the crown at the Luperca/ia. He had brought the crown
with him and deliberately tested the feelings of the Roman people and ra ised the
suspicions. 30° Caesar, who had rejected the d iadem, had been killed ; Antonius, who
had offered the crown , was still alive and had clai med that monarch ical power for
h imself. Then , when Caesa r was out of the pictu re , Antonius, although supposed ly
espousing comprom ise , orchestrated the ru in of the tyrann icides with his oration at
Caesar's funeral, thereby inciting the wrath of the common people. 301 With in days ,
Antonius h imself was completely out of personal debt. 302
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Cicero clearly wanted people read ing th is speech to believe that he had delivered
it in person. He demanded to know why Antonius had come to hear the speech with
guards bearing swords in their hands. He wanted to know why the Temple of Concord's
doors were closed when Anton ius' Rome was clea rly at war. 303 In conclusion , Cicero
once again th reatened Anton ius' life by rem i nd i ng him that the Roman people now knew
how wonderfu l it felt to rid themselves of a tyrant. Cicero declared that he did not fear
Antonius and was willing to forfeit h is own life if it would guarantee Rome's liberty. 304
I n late N ovember 44, Antonius retu rned to Rome with the intention of declaring
Octavian a public enemy. H owever, he received word that a large n u m ber of men had
comm itted themselves to Octavian and, alarmed , he left Rome . It is at about th is time
that Cicero published Philippic II. Since Cicero had not delivered the speech in person ,
h is timing for its publ ication was excellent. He had not been able to ride the wave of
emotions by respond ing in person to Antonius. Therefore , Antonius' retu rn to Rome in
N ovember wh ich included drunken behavior, th reats and, finally, fl ight seemed to offer
the perfect opportun ity for Cicero to a rouse the people's negative feelings towards
Antonius. Soon thereafter, Anton ius proceeded against Decimus B rutus in Gau l . 305
On December 20, the Senate was cal led together by the tribu nes ostensibly to
discuss the incoming consuls on the Kalends of January 43. However, Decimus B rutus
had let the Senate know that he intended to keep C isalpine Gaul wh ich prompted
Cicero to attend the meeti ng and deliver the th ird Philippic in defense of D. B rutus' claim
to that province. The prom ise of Cicero's appearance apparently d rew fu ll attendance .
303
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I t was d u ring th is speech that Cicero first declared Octavian to be Rome's savior against
Antonius and reite rated h is lack of rega rd for Anton ius as consul. Decimus B rutus and
Octavian were now Rome's champions and clearly, to C icero, Anton ius was the
enemy. 306

THE THIRD PHILIPPIC AND BEYOND: DISASTER FOR CICERO AND ROME

As m isgu ided a decision as the publication of the second Philippic was, the
sentiments and beliefs expressed by Cicero in the th i rd Philippic were tru ly dangerous.
H owever, Cicero told Trebonius that he believed the th ird Philippic to be the true
beg i n n ing of h is efforts to retu rn liberty to the Roman people. 307 It was true that Rome's
government was in flux and there was g reat uncertai nty about its future and its rig htfu l
leaders. Nevertheless, if Cicero and others were able to accept H i rtius and Pansa, who
had been appointed by Caesa r as consuls for 43, as rig htfu l successors to those
positions, then it seems that they were also obl igated to recogn ize Anton ius as their
consul for the year 44 . C icero's h istory with Anton ius and the personal umbrage he
took from Antonius' insulting remarks cost h im objectivity and made him a hypocrite . At
the very time that Cicero was advocating overlooking the laws , he was writing De
Officiis in an effort to teach h is son h ow to be a better citize n . He knew that it would not

be i n Rome's interest, from his point of view, for Antonius and Octavian to ever join
forces. That would end forever C icero's personal hope that Marcus B rutus would lead
the rep u blicans and be a buffer between Octavian and Anton ius. 308 Cicero had
306
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obviously been swayed by Octavian's charm and flattery, so that he was willing to
overlook the fact that Octavian had raised an a rmy on his own without the sanction of
the Senate . Also , possibly because he believed that he and Octavian could one day be
co-consuls or that he could be the young man's advisor, Cicero had clearly decided to
favor Octavian in any confl icts and support him as Rome's only hope for s u rvival .
I n a n y event, the Cicero o f 63 would have considered the man he h a d become i n
44-43 guilty of crimes similar to those o f Catiline's conspirators . 309 He h a d favored the
assassination of Caesar wh ich , in itself, was considered treasonous by some.
However, h is complete dismissal of Anton ius as consul and his ability to defy Anton ius'
ed icts, especially with rega rd to the assign ment of provi nces, was less defensible. In
his mind, Cicero appeared to have painted Antonius as pure evil and any actions
brought against him, legal or not, could be considered patriotic. Also , in a state sorely
lacking in leadership, with only seventeen consulars in the Senate , Cicero ran into little
opposition to his agenda.
Rome was in tu rmoil, Cicero's hatred of Antonius and affection for Octavian
spu rred him on to assume a leaders h ip position he felt he had always deserved . H is
ego had not diminished with his years , but any sense of moderation certa inly had . He
consistent resisted any negotiations with Antonius. U ltimately, he seemed to believe
that peace was impossible and that the only solution was not tumultus, but be/furn. Th is
behavior seems to exh ibit a lack of reason in Cicero who, goaded by personal hatred ,
was no longer capable of making decisions based on objectivity and wise deliberation .
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H is goal was the utter obliteration of Antonius and he had assu med the role of
puppetmaster in control of all the req u isite strings.
I t is s u rprising that none of the lead conspirators ever retu rned to Rome to add
their voices to C icero's. With Antonius out of Rome and with Cicero leading the Senate ,
they could have helped Rome's anti-Caesarian cause. Instead , they all stayed out of
Italy, with Marcus B rutus criticizing C icero's advocacy of Octavian to Atticus . 310 It would
be interesting to trace their actions and attitudes while Cicero was flying solo in Rome ,
especially with a n emphasis on whether or not they noted any serious behavioral
changes in Cicero.
The Philippics became an ever-escalating, frequently irrational, tantrum for
C icero . The Senate was impressed with h is consular status and his willingness to take
the reins, bel ieving him to be the same man they had trusted and followed in the past.
In spite of h is willing ness to ignore the laws , make enem ies of the cu rrent consuls, defy
consular edicts and agg ressively insist on wa r, Cicero often won the day. However,
even when Cicero lost in the first rou n d , as in the sending of the first embassy to
Antony, the later negative resu lts only strengthened h is resolve and, unfortu nately, his
vitriol. Thus, although Cicero had beg u n to q uestion Octavian's loyalty, he contin ued
avid ly to support him in the Senate and to push for Antony's utter defeat.
After M uti n a , Cicero and the Senate m istakenly believed that Antonius had been
completely defeated and was permanently out of the pictu re. Th is attitude obviously
affected the senators who, showing him no g ratitude whatsoever, excl uded Octavia n
and h is men from their consideration , basically discarding them . Cicero thought he
310
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could still control Octavian and thus made some attempts to form a coalition with him in
the vain hope that he might back the repu blican cause. 311 The Senate scoffed at th is.
In add itio n , they did not put Octavian on the comm ission to review the legality of
Antonius's consulship nor did they include D . B rutus and Octavian on the board of
veteran affairs to hand le land allotments . Later, they refused to grant Octavian a
consulship, a triumph and any reward for h is troops. 312 Octavian knew that his
relationsh ip with the Senate and Cicero was over and that he was on his own . 313
Even though the Senate was u ltimately to blame for Octavian joining forces with
Antonius and Lepidus and forming the Th ird Triumvirate, Cicero had al lowed th is to
happen . Although Cicero den ied having said it, Octavian had heard that Cicero had
always intended to use h i m , praise and encourage h i m , and eventually discard him
(laudandum, ornandum, tollendum) . He believed what he had heard . 314

From the Ides of March th rough the last Philippic, Cicero seemed to have lost
touch with reality. I n the end, he had misjudged the potential power of the tyrann icides'
action and their ability to repair Rome. Although Octavian's ultimate objective should
have been clea r to him considering who the young man was and how he had arrived
on the scene, Cicero had underestimated Octavian and succum bed to his calculating
charm. C icero's history with Antonius had prejud iced him to the point that he was
u nable to see the man clearly. He was bli nded by Antonius' tendency to debauchery
and wild behavior and, therefore , foolishly ignored his innate intelligence and d riving
ambitio n . In the cases of both Octavian and Anton ius, Cicero neg lected to take into
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consideration the loyalty of their men and the simple fact that they were the ones who
had the troops. Because so m uch commun ication from the tyrann icides and others
outside Rome came to him personally as if he were head of state, he began to delude
himself into believing that he was capable of military as well as political leadership.
However, Cicero's Rome was militarily powerless (he had no legions), a fact he
seemed to forget.
The last two years of Cicero's life seemed to be a d i rect parallel of the last two
years of the Repu blic's existence . Both were d riven to extreme actions, yet slowly
coming apart, fig hting for their lives and finally d isappearing.
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